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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES L. BENNETT,
Respondent and Cross-Appellarvt·,
vs.

Case No.

THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,

7287

Appellant and Cross-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND
CROSS-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The parties will be referred to as in the Court below.
All italics are ours.
Plaintiff deems it proper, helpful and necessary to
make a rather full, complete and exhaustive statement
of facts in order that the Court may be fully advised
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with respect to the evidence concerning all material
issues.
The event resulting in the injuries to plaintiff occurred while he was engaged in the performance of his
duties as brakeman in defendant's employ at Buena
Vista, Colorado at about the hour of 8 :35 o'clock p.m.
on the 7th day of January, 1948.
His action was filed in the Third Judicial District.
Court in and for :Salt Lake County, Utah, where the matter was tried before a jury, The jury's verdict, dated
l\1arch 24, 1948, is as follows (R. 72) :
''We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case,
find the issues in favor of the Plaintiff and against
the Defendant and assess damages as follows:
Total Damage ------------------------------$70,000.00
Diminution, by reason of contributory negligence, if any __ $20,000.00
Net amount of verdict ----------------$50,000.00''
The defendant's Motion for New Trial was denied
on the 27th day of September, 1948, some six months
following the conclusion of the trial.
In his complaint, the plaintiff charged defendant
with suddenly, unexpectedly and without warning causing the speed of the locomotive handling the cut of cars·
upon which plaintiff was stationed to be sharply reduced,
thereby causing the slack to run in, producing a severe
and unexpected jar, jolt and jerk of the cars, which
threw plaintiff off the car onto the rails where his right
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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arm was crushed and mangled, necessitating amputation
at the shoulder.
Plaintiff also invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, alleging that at all times prior to the occurrence
of the event complained of defendant had exclusive control of the locomotive and each and all of the cars comprising the cut upon which plaintiff was stationed and
working, and that the violent and extraordinary slack
action which caused plaintiff to' be thrown from the top
of the car was an. event of such nature and character
that in the ordinary course of' things would not have
occurred had defendant exercis~d due and proper care
in the operation of its locomotiye (R. 5, 6).
The trial court did not submit the matter of res ipsa
loquitur to the jury but did submit the issue of the sudden jerk. Instruction No. 7 (R. 59) was as follows:
"It was the duty of the defendant company,
acting through its employees, to use ordinary and
reasonable care in its railroad operations to
avoid injury to its employees, and to operate its
train in such a manner as to avoid any unusual,
excessive, and unexpected amount of slack action
or jerking upon said cars.
''If you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that in the course of his duty, the plaintiff was on top of said car, and that there was
unusual, excessive, and unexpected jerking thereof, which proximately caused him to fall therefrom, that would indicate negligence on the part
of the defendant, for which the plaintiff would
have
a right to recover damages."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Defendant admitted that it was engaged as a common carrier by rail in interstate commerce at the time
of plaintiff's injury and likewise admitted that plaintiff
was engaged in the performance of his duties at said
time and place and that he suffered the injuries complained of. Defendant denied the other allegations of
tJlaintiff's complaint.
Upon the admitted facts the remedy afforded plaintiff is controlled by the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A., Section 51, providing, in so far as material here, as follows:
''Every common carrier by railroad while
engaging in commerce between any of the several
states or territories, * * * shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is
employed by such carrier in such commerce * * *
for such injury or death resulting in whole or
in part from the negligence of any of the officers,
agents, or employees of such carrier * * * ; ''
and 'Section 53, reading as follows :

''In all actions hereafter brought against any
common carrier by railroad under or by virtue
of any of the provisions of this chapter to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in his
death, the fact that the employee may have been
guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a
recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by
the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee: Provided,
that no such employee who may be injured or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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killed shall be held to haYe been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such comn1on rarrier of any statute
enarted for the safety of en1plo)·ees contributed
to the injury or death of such employee."
There was no material conflict in the testimony.
The endence con.clusively demonstrated that plaintiff
was injured in the course of his employment, conclusively
demonstrated that defendant, acting through its servants, agents and employees other than plaintiff, so
negligently and carelessly controlled its train as to cause
a sudden, unexpected and extraordinarily severe jerk
of the car upon which plaintiff was stationed and that
due to said jerk plaintiff was dislodged and thrown from
the car onto the tracks, where his right arm was mangled
and mutilated by rolling car wheels, necessitating amputation at the shoulder.
Under the evidence the negligence of defendant became a question for the jury and the jury upon proper
instructions found defendant negligent as charged. The
jury, however, erroneously diminished the verdict on
account of contributory negligence and this error Is
brought before this Court by plaintiff's cross-appeal.
Defendant assigns as error the refusal of the court
to grant its motion for a new trial, contending that the
verdict was excessive and returned under the influence
of passion and prejudice engendered by the admission
of improper testimony and by a series of prejudicial incidents occurring at the trial. It also assigns as error the
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6
admission in evidence of plaintiff's exhibits "G" and

"H".
B.

THE FACTS

We shall present the facts of this case under the following headings :
(a)

LIABILITY.

(b)

DAMAGES.

(c)

THE TABLES.
(a)

LIABILITY

In this section we shall endeavor to cover in detail
all of the evidence pertaining to the event causing injuries, for the purpose of revealing the abundance of
proof to sustain the verdict, and likewise to demonstrate
the absolute absence of any evidence whatsoever to support the finding of contributory negligence submitted to
the jury over plaintiff's objection as a result of which
plaintiff's verdict was reduced and diminished as hereinabove set forth.
Beginning at Record, on page 126, plaintiff's testimony reveals the following: He was twenty-six years of
age when injured. He first entered the employ of the
defendant at Salida, Colorado, and his seniority date was
established as of February 18, 1942. When injured he
was working as head brakeman on a regular job. He
had been able to hold a regular job most of the time
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since his return from Navy Service, in November of
19-15. He was injured while working on a regularly
scheduled east bound freight train. He was called at
:Jiinturn at about 1 :-!5 o'clock p.m., the crew consisting
of engineer, George B. Cooley; fireman, Robert J.
Intchauspe; conductor, A. R. Williams; hind brakeman,
Drexel ~Ioore; and plaintiff, head brakeman.
It is the duty of the head brakeman to let off brakes,
open couplers, connect and disconnect air hose. He more
or less follows the engine around, makes joints, couples
and uncouples cars, passes signals and throws switches.
Before the train reached Buena Vista plaintiff received instructions from the conductor as to the switching movements to be made there. When the train reached
Buena Vista it consisted of sixty cars powered by fourunit Diesel Engine No. 546. It was dark.
The orders were to divide the train after it stopped
on the main line between the tenth and eleventh cars.
Plaintiff dropped off near the main line switch as the
engine went by preparatory to making the cut at the desired point and lining the switch. He was equipped with
a brake club made of hardwood, approximately three to
three and a half feet in length and about three inches
in circumference, and a lighted lantern. After the train
stopped plaintiff turned the angle cocks at the joining
ends of the tenth and eleventh cars, broke the air hose
and pulled the pin. He then gave a proceed signal and
the locomotive, with the ten cars coupled, moved on
down the main line until the rear car of the cut cleared
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the switch points. Plaintiff dismounted from the tenth
car, gave the engineer a stop sign and lined the switch
so that the cut could be backed off the main line onto
the passing track. After all the required switching operations were carried out on the tracks adjacent to and
connecting with the main line track, the locomotive with
fourteen cars coupled proceeded out along the Ice House
Track toward the main line track, where the outbound
train was to be made up. During this movement plaintiff sustained his injuries. His testimony concerning the
event is as follows, commencing at Record 144:
'' Q.

All right, now, after you had accomplished
that movement that I have now recited to you,
just what did you do¥

A.

I was on top of the rear car, which is the
14th car, and I gave a proceed signal to the
engineer that-to proceed down the ice house
track.

Q.

You had a hold of fourteen cars¥

A.

Yes.

Q.

That is, after you had made these spots at
the ice house, did you uncouple the cut at
the point between the fourteenth and fifteenth
car¥

A.

No, sir ; I was on top passing signals ; the
conductor made the cut. In order to make
this cut, the slack was bunched in, and, in
order to make the cut, why we had to back
the fourteen cars back enough so that theY
could pull the pin, and, on the ground, yo~
can't give a signal to the engineer, so there
has to be somebody on top in order to gi\·c
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the signal, and somebody else had to pull the
pin.
top~

Q.

Did anybody tell you to go high, go on

~\.

\Yell, not that I remember; I mean, that was
just in course of my work

Q.

Did you regard that as being your duty to
go high on the fourteenth car~

A.

Yes, sir, that was my duty.

* * * *
Q. What was the nature of the signal you passed
to the engine~
A. It was a proceed signal.
Q.

Where with respect to the stock loading
chutes was the fourteenth car at the time you
went high~

A.

It was quite a ways forward of stock chutes.

Q. East or
A.

west~

West.

Q. Do you know whether or not there was any
signs, warning signs, placed there in connection with these stock loading chutes~
A.

Yes, sir, there is a sign there that warns you
of the stock chute; it says, 'This sign will
not clear a man on the side or on top of
car.'

Q.

Now, I want to know about where the locomotive was when you passed this sign from
the top of the fourteenth car~

A.

I imagine it was east, somewhere east of the
or west, I mean.
sign,
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sign~

Q.

Somewhat west of the

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Where was it with reference-having in mind
the crossover from the passing track, stock
ice house, about .where was the locomotive?

A.

I imagine two car-lengths west of the crossover.
* * * *

Q.

Now, did the engineer respond to the proceed signal~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And, at the time that the train was placed
in motion, where were you~

A.

On top of the rear car, in the middle of the
car.
• ,. * *

Q.

* * All right, now, just using your own
words, you tell us now what happened as the
cut of cars that you were on was moving
toward the east pursuant to the proceed signal you passed to the engineer 1

A.

Well, as I stated before, I gave a 'proceed'
signal, and he accepted proceed signal and
started westward down the ice house track.

Q.

Is that westward or eastward~
• • • *

A.

Excuse me, It was going eastward down the
ice house track, and he was going, I
thought, at a pretty good rate of speed, and
we got-I made, we got down there close to
the derail, and I made preparations to get
off to line the mainline switch from the
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passing track, and, as I was in a crouched
position, why the slack ran in and gave me
a violent jerk, and that dislodged me, and
the slack run back out and threw me in hetween the thirteenth' and fourteenth car, and
I hit my head on something, I don't know
whether it was on the thirteenth or fourteenth car; it all happened so fast, and, then,
the next thing I knew I was on the ground,
and seemed like I was drugged for a minute.
Then my-I don't recall whether my arm
was run over before I was drug·ged or after;
in other words, it was just a mere second
that I was drugged for a while, and then I
remember the cars just running on down the
track, and I made a pretense of getting up,
of standing up, and I got in about a half
crouch and fell back down, and then I tried
to crawl for a ways-I thought. it was a ways
-and I seen I couldn't do that, so I just
started hollering for help, and, after a few
seconds, why there was two or three people
around me at that time, * * *

'* • * *
A.

Well, and they could see that I was hurt,
and, naturally, they wanted to do everything
that they could for me, and - -

Q. What was the condition of your right arm
at that time 1
A. Well, I don't really know the condition of it.
It was run over, but it still was in contactI mean, I still will say I still had my arm.
Q. Where did the train that you were on stop
there, near where you were hurt 1
A. I don't know exactly where the train stopped.
I didn't pay any at!ention after-all that I
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remember was that the cars were just-kept
on rolling by, and I didn't pay any attention
to where cars stopped or anything.
Q.

Where did you fall with reference to the derail you pointed out to the jury~

A.

I believe it was about eight feet west of the
derail.

Q.

Which switch was it you were going to line¥

A.

The main line switch from the passing track.

Q.

Charles, you stated that the train, the cut,
was moving 'down along the stock ice house
track, you had some idea of the speed; will
you tell the jury, if you have any opinion, as
to how fast the train was moving at the time
that this slack action took place¥

A.

I'd say twelve to fifteen miles an hour.

Q.

Can you describe the slack action or the
jerk, whatever it was, that dislodged you¥

* * * *
A.

Well, it was an action of running in, this
fourteenth car ran into the rest of the train
with a hard motion that came at, at a violent
rate, and then it backed out.

* * * *
A.

Came in a backward position, and this action was enough that it dislodged me from
the grab iron, and the action, the movement
backward, was enough to throw me in between the thirteenth and fourteenth car.

Q.

Now, just before this slack action occurred,
just how were you stationed, and where on
this fourteenth car¥
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A.

\Yell, I was in the middle of the car before,
and, as it proceeded down, why I proceeded
to the end of the car in order to get down.

Q.

\Yhich end, the east or west

A.

The east end of the car.

end~

Q. Where was the side ladder that you were
going down~
~\.

It's on the south end, southerly direction.
*
*
=II<

:jj:

Q.

Be on the south side at the east

A.

Yes, sir.

end~

THE COURT: That be the right side looking
forward?
A.

Yes, the right side.

Q.

On the engineer's

A.

Yes, sir.

side~

Q. Did you have hold of anything before the
slack action came~
A.

Yes, I had hold of my lantern and brake club,
and, if I recall correctly, I had hold of the
grab, the top grab iron on top of the car.

Q. Where is that grab iron with reference to
the side ladder~
A. It is on top of the car.
ladder~

Q.

Directly above the side

A.

Yes, a little ways north, to the left of the
car, in order that you can get up on.
A JUROR:

Did-is this permissible Y
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THE COURT: If you suggest the question
to me, maybe we couldA JUROR: On this grab iron that is down,
would you have to be kneeling to have hold of
that grab iron; that is, it is up if you are on top
of the car~
Q.

Describe this grab iron on top of the car
you have mentioned.

A.

Grab iron on top of the car, there is, there is
a grab iron made in an 'L' position, held in
with brackets, and it is secured there so that,
when you're climbing on top, ascending or
descending either the side ladder or the end
ladder, that, when you reach the top, that
you can grab hold of this grab iron and go
immediately on up. When you are descending from the top of the car, you grab the grab
iron in order to descend either to the side of
the ladder or the end ladder, and you have
to be in crouched position descending the
top of the car.

THE COURT: What he wants to know, I
think, is how far above the top of the car does the
grab iron project~
A.

Well, roughly, I would say four inches above
the top of the car.

Q.

Now, did you testify that you did or that
you didn't have hold of this grab iron just
before the slack action came~
A. I don't really recall whether I had hold of
the grab iron with my left hand or not.
Q. How were you carrying your lantern and the
brake club at that time, which hand~
A. Think I was carrying them in my right hand.
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Q. Had both of then1 in your right
A.

hand~

Yes, sir.

Q. \r as your body and feet still on top of the
car at the time the action took

place~

A.

Yes, I believe so.

Q.

Before this movement commenced; that was
after all the switching had taken place and
at the time that you gave the proceed signal
from on top of the .car out near the ice house,
did you know what the movement was going
to be~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. .And what was that movement to

be~

A.

\Ye was to continue out on the ice house or
stock track to the main line, and line the
mainline switch and back up the cut of cars
westward to the remainder of the train, and
couple the air a~d line the switches, the derail, and the ice house switch, and go on to
town.

Q.

\Vhen that movement commenced, what was
the condition of these two switches, the mainline switch and the stock ice house track
switch~

A.

They were all lined for the ice house track.

Q. And would it have been necessary to throw
either of these switches in order to permit
that train to move clear out on the main line~
A.

Q.
A.

In eastward direction~
Yes.
No, they were already lined for that movement.
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Q.

And where did you expect the train to be
stopped when it made the first stop after
movement commenced~

A.

East of the mainline switch, in order that I
could line the mainline switch.

Q.

Well, stop of the fourteenth car there, car
you were on, was to the east of the mainline
switch~

A. Yes." (R. 144-155)
On cross examination the plaintiff gave other pertinent testimony on the matter of liability. At Record, page
165, he testified that he had participated in switching
operations at Buena Vista before his injury and on
numerous occasions had ridden and performed his duties
from the tops of cars in switching movements at that
place. On the occasion of his injury he was the only
trainman on the cut of cars and the movement was under
his direction. At Record, page 169, he testified:
'' Q.

And why were you riding in the center of the
car~

A. Because that's the place to ride in case ofwell, it is a safety rule that you are to ride
in the center of the car.
it~

Q.

That is a safe place to ride, isn't

A.

Yes.

Q.

Why is it a safe place to

A.

Well, if anything happens that you go in
emergency, or there is slack action that you
could move either direction without being

ride~
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thrown off, I n1ean, you have a chance to
catch your balance before you are thrown.''
~-\.fter the plaintiff passed the proceed signal it became his duty to dismount from the train as the east
end of the last car approached the main line switch.
Plaintiff remained where he was stationed when the proceed signal was given until the car upon which he was
stationed was approaching the derail and then he started
forward on the running board of the car for the purpose
of dismounting.

On recross examination plaintiff testified that brakemen riding the tops of cars out of the ice house and
passing tracks toward the main line usually got down
just before they reached the main road crossing which
is indicated on the map, Exhibit "D ". Plaintiff expected that the train would not be slowed down at all
until the fourth or fifth car was out on the main line.
The slack action which caused him to be thrown from
the train was much more severe than the ordinary slack
action developed in the movement of trains in switching
operations.
From plaintiff's deposition taken by defendant, the
following questions and answers were read into the
Record (R. 184, 185) :

'' Q.

How do you know the slack ran in?

A.

\Yell, that is the only thi~g that could have
happened.

Q.

\Vhat visible signs were there?
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A.

A violent running in and a run out. There
is a down-grade and when he puts the air to
these cars, he used the independent air; when
he puts the air to the diesel, the diesel is the
only braking power he had; in other words,
that he used. Up and down hill grade, and
going at the speed he was going, and the
weight of the diesel, as heavy as it is, when
he puts air to that, if he puts too much, why
there will be a violent slack action running
in on the cars.''

The witness, F. H. Green, testified that he was a
combination trainmaster and road foreman not in the
employ of the defendant; that he was acquainted with
and had operated its diesel engines; that the approximate length of a four-unit diesel was 194 feet between
the couplers and that such an engine would weigh approximately 460 tons; that these engines are equipped
with independent brakes which operate on the trucks
of the diesel only and also automatic brakes that operate
the brakes on all of the train as well as on the engine ;
that the independent air brakes can be applied in either
of two positions, one a slow application and the other
a quick application; and that there are eight sets of
trucks of four wheels each on a four-unit diesel, all subject to the power of the independent air brakes exerted
through 32 cylinders and 32 pistons. On a steam engine
there are either two or four brakes controlled by the
independent brakes dependent on the type of engine.
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scending eastward. At Record, page 124, the witness
testified:

· '' Q. Does the slack action depend upon the movement of the locomotive'
A.

Yes, it depends on a changing of the speed
of the different portions of the train.

Q. Well, would this be true, that whatever slack
action there was on the rear end of the train
would be caused by the motion of the engine'
A.

Yes ; whatever slack action at the rear would
be caused by changing the speed of the locomotive.''

The witness, R. J. Intchauspe, testified that he was
the fireman on the diesel handling the train at Buena
Vista upon which the plaintiff was working when injured; that he had been a fireman since 1937 and had
worked on both steam and diesel locomotives ; that as
the train pulled out of the ice house tracks he was looking out of the window on the left side of the diesel and
.observed a high proceed signal from a trainman located
on top of a car; that it was dark and the signal was made
by a lighted lantern; that the engineer released the air
and started forward and as the train was rolling out
toward the main line he kept looking back for signals ;
that the locomotive would naturally roll the freest on
the tracks at Buena Vista if th~ movement was toward
the east as the diesel was equipped with roller-bearing
wheels (R. 202) and therefore thk locomotive would exert
pulling power on the cars as the train moved toward the
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main line; that when the locomotive reached a point near
that marked I-3 on Exhibit ''D'' he lost sight of the light
on the rear car and reported this fact to the engineer,
and the engineer applied the air immediately and almost
came to a stop and then released the air and the train
moved forward onto the main line until the rear end
cleared the road crossing.
Operating Rule No. 13 was received in evidence and
read to the jury (R. 207). It states:
''Employes giving signals must locate themselves so as to be plainly seen, and if signal disappears movement must be stopped until signal
is again visible. Trainmen and enginemen must
use care to avoid acting on wrong signals.''

D. K. MOORE testified that he was employed by the
defendant as a brakeman and conductor and that he was
acquainted with the yards at Buena Vista, Colorado and
had performed his duties there on numerous occasions.
He was rear brakeman on the train upon which plaintiff
was working when injured.
On the rna tter of train slack in a train of fourteen
cars the witness testified (R. 211):

"Q. Well, all right, tell the jury about how much
slack you think there would be in fourteen
cars.
A. Well, on a grade like that, there would be,
there would have been enough to knock you
around on top of the cars, whenever it run
in or run out.
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Q.

Can you tell us about how much play there
is~

A.

I would say eight to twelve inches on each
car."

In describing slack action Moore testified as follows
(R. 211, 212, 213, 21 ±, 215) :

"Q. Xow, what happens when a train is moving
down a grade of about one per cent at three
to four, five to six, or ten to twelve, fifteen
miles an hours at Buena Vista, and the speed
of the locomotive is checked~
A.

The cars run in, there will be a jerk on the
rear end.

Q.

Would that jerk on the rear end, would that
slack action be perceptible to the crew of the
engine~

A.

I don't think so; I never noticed when I was
riding the engine; the diesel is pretty heavy.

Q.

I see. Now, if the speed of the engine were
checked while the cars were running, would
there be any spring action following the
running in of the slack~

A.

There is a certain amount of that, yes.

Q.

Can you describe the effect of that spring
action on the rear car~

A.

Well, it is hard to describe slack action or
spring action, whatever you call it, but it
will run in, then stretch out again, do that
on level ground.''
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'' Q.

I see. Well, what would be the effect of that
action on the rear cut of a cut of fourteen
cars, in your opinion~

A.

Well, it would mean the biggest jolt; it would
mean the biggest jar. It is like the end of a
whip.

Q.

What effect would it have upon a brakeman
stationed upon the rear car of fourteen-unit
train~

* * * *
A.

Didn't watch himself, he would get knocked
off.

Q. Do you have any instructions ·as to the position the trainman must take if he was giving
signals from on top of a car~
A.

No, sir, you don't have any definite position,
take just wherever he can pass signals. There
is no safe place on top of box car when it is
moving.

Q.

There is no safe

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Why is

A.

Slack action is bad always, especially with a
diesel.

place~

that~

* * * *
Q.

What do you mean, 'they are more severe on
a diesel~'

A.

Well, there is brakes on every wheel. When
they set, they stop. There is a lot of weight
there on the steam engine. It is just on the
drivers and the tender all I know; I don't
know mechanical part of engine, but I do
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know action on top of car when they set
brakes on a diesel, you have to be awful careful.
Q. How does the slack produced by sudden slowing of the engine on train moving five or
six miles an hour compare in severity with
slack action produced on train moving
twelve, fifteen n1iles an hour?
A. Not much different; of course, slower train
moving, harder jolt will be.

•

•

'*

•

Now, are you acquainted with the practice
of dismounting, if there is-is there a practice with respect to the place where the brakeman starts to dismount from the train.
* * * *
A. Well, if you was going to prepare to get the
switch, the main line switch, you would have
to get down four, five, or six car-lengths to
be at the bottom rung of the ladder to drop
off at the switch; otherwise, go beyond
switch, and have to walk back."
Q.

M. C. FEATHER testified that he was a railroad
brakeman and conductor employed by the defendant, and
that he was acquainted with the yards and tracks at
Buena Vista and had assisted in switching cars at that
point on numerous occasions. At Record, pages 219, 220,
221, 222 and 223, he testified:

"Q. Are you acquainted with what is known to
railroaders as 'slack
A.

action'~

All brakemen are acquainted with slack action; yes, I am.

* * • •
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Q.

Having in mind a situation where a four-unit
diesel was handling fourteen cars, the movement commencing at a time when the diesel
engine was, maybe, from 150 to 250 feet west
of the cross-over connecting the stock ice
house track with the passing track, that,
while the train was standing at that point,
the engine crew received a proceed signal
from a brakeman standing at the top of the
fourteenth car, the brakes on the diesel were
released and the diesel, together with the
train, started rolling toward the east and
toward the mainline track, that when the
diesel engine had reached a point just on the
mainline track and a short distance to the
east of the mainline switch, that the speed of
the engine was suddenly arrested by the application of the independent brakes on the
diesel when the speed of the train at that
time was somewhere between four and twelve,
fourteen, fifteen miles an hour, would you
have any opinion as to whether or not the
slowing of the engine would produce any
slack action on the fourteenth car~

A.

Yes, sir, I do.

Q.

Do you have any opinion as to the nature of
that slack action~

A.

Yes, sir, I do.

Q.

Will you state your

A.

My opinion is that there would be a severe
run-in of the slack first; that is, the cars
would tend to run into the diesel, .and, due
to this spring action-and, you say, he then
released the air~

Q.

Yes.

opinion~
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~\..

Q.

Due to the spring· action at the couplers,
draw-bars, draft gear, and releasing the air
on the diesel to let it start rolling again,
there would be a running out of the slack
And what effect would that slack action have
upon a trainman stationed upon that fourteenth car~

* * * *
A.

\Yell, you would get a double jolt; you would
get a run-in and run-out; it would get you
one way, then slam you the other. I haven't
been knocked off a car, but I have been
knocked down on a car many times.

* * * *
In the causing and producing of slack action
in trains being moved by diesels and by
steamers, do you-is there any difference in
that slack action produced by these two types
of locomotives~
A. In a high speed movement, train movement,
there probably would not be, but in low speed
or switching movement, there is much more
severe slack in using diesel than it is in
using steam engine.
Q. And why is that~
A. From observation, I would say it's from the
fact that the diesel engine is on roller bearings, and freight cars are all on friction bars,
and diesel has tendency to run away from
them; starts, sets up a condition where slack
action kinda curve, than where straight action, each wheel having own brake cylinder
and action.''
Q.

J. A. WILLS, of· Buena Vista, a witness called by
defendant, testified that he was a telegraph operator
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at Buena Vista. His testimony on cross-examination
amply supports the proposition that there was a rather
rapid slowing down of the train at about the time plaintiff was injured. He testified that he was inside the depot
at the window and saw the engine and fourteen cars
go by; that it was dark and the lights from the depot
illuminated the train; that when the engine first came
into his view opposite the window it was traveling from
twelve to fifteen miles an hour but when the rear end
came into view it was traveling about eight miles per
hour (R. 309, 310).
There is an entire want and lack of any evidence
whatsoever of plaintiff's contributory negligence in
the Record. Proof of contributory negligence does not
exist here. There is Iio evidence from which an inference of contributory negligence can be deduced. The
case simply stated is this:
Charles L. Bennett, the plaintiff, stationed himself upon the running board near the center of the top
of the fourteenth car from the locomotive for the purpose of passing signals to the engineer. He was required to so station himself not only under uniform
practice, but because the train movement could only be
made upon proper signals from the train crew to the
engineer and plaintiff's position on top of the car was
the only position from which signals could be passed to
the engineer. After the signal was passed it became
plaintiff's duty to dismount. In the performance of
this duty he walked forward to the ·front end of the
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car to go down the side ladder located there. He did
not stumble or fall or do any other thing which could
be designated as a negligent act or omission. He stooped
over to grasp the handhold on top of the car above the
ladder, this act was necessary. While so situated the
violent jarring occurred which dislodged him, threw
him from the car and caused his injury. If there is
one scintilla of evidence in this record of contributory
negligence, the appellant should point it out. It has
not done so in its brief, it could not do so in the trial
court, and we know it cannot do so now. We say to the
Court that this record may be canvassed and scrutinized
with the greatest of care in every part and portion
thereof without disclosing a single scintilla of evidence
to support the trial court in ~ubmitting the issue of
contributory negligence to the jury or support the jury's
verdict diminishing plaintiff's ,damages in the amount
of $20,000.00 on account of contributory negligence.
·
(b)

DAMAGES

Immediately following the occurrence which resulted in plaintiff's injury a doctor and an ambulance
were summoned. The doctor gave him two hypos and
he was placed in an ambulance and a tourniquet was
placed on his arm. He was then taken to Salida. Before the doctor arrived he suff~red much pain as could
be reasonably expected (R. 156). He likewise suffered severe pain during the trip from Buena Vista to
the hospital at Salida. He never lost consciousness
at
time.Law Library.
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was amputated near the shoulder. He remained in the
hospital eleven days. During all of the period of his
convalescence he suffered continuously from pain. In
describing his pain the plaintiff stated (R. 156, 157):
"A.

Well, I have a throbbing sensation in the
stump of my arm, and, and it is, throbs almost continously. It is a very uneasy feeling,
and, at first, I had a shocking sensation after I was released from the hospital. It
was a sensation that if you put your, this
left, when I put my left arm in certain positions, it was more or less like an electric
shock; it went through my body."

About two months after the injury another portion
of plaintiff's right arm was amputated and plaintiff
was under the care of the doctor at the time of the
trial.
Plaintiff Is naturally righthanded.

In describing

his difficulties due to the loss of his right arm, plaintiff
stated (R. 158, 159) :
"A.

It is impossible for me to tie my own shoes
and for me to wash underneath my arm-pit
at the left arm and for me to wash my elbow
or the back of my hand; that's impossible
for me to do, and I have great difficulty
in buttoning my shirt and trousers and for
cutting meat; I can't cut meat unless it is
awful tender and I can cut it with a fork;
and writing, I haven't, being righthanded
as I was before, I didn't never write lefthanded before. I have a very difficult time
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in writing, then I have nothing to hold the
paper .with. In order to write, somebody
has to hold the paper in order for me to
write.

Q. 'Yha t about reading books, news p ape r s,
things of that kind~
A.

"~ell, I have quite a difficulty in turning the
the page and holding it and reading-I mean,
there's, you can't hold the paper out; you
just have to hold it in the middle or get
down over the paper, or other ways, reading
that way.

Q. What about dressing yourself, putting on
your shirt and clothes, things of that kind~
A.

It is very difficult.

Q. Do you know of any employment that you
could get at this time in your physical condition that would yield you a living or an income~

A.

No, I don't.

Q. Are you in a condition at this time, as far
as you know, to earn any money~
A.

No, I'm not at the present time."

In speaking of his earnings, plaintiff testified
(R. 128):

'' Q. What was your rate of pay at the time you
were injured, Charles~
A.

Well, about $350 a month.

Q. About
A.

what~

About $350 a month.
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Tell the jury your hourly or daily wage rate
you were drawing a.t that time~
A. At the time that I was hurt, it was 11.55 a
hundred. We go by mileage instead of hourly basis, and it was 11.55 a hundred; then
it is time and a half for overtime after the
eight hours.
Q.

Q.

And, having in mind the five or six or eight
months prior to the time of your injury,
will you state your average earnings earned
during that period, approximately, best you
can~

A.

By the

month~

Q. Yes, by the month~
A. It was 350, approximately."
DR. REED S. CLEGG, an orthopedic surgeon,
testified with respect to the injured arm as follows
(R. 229, 230) :
"A.

There has been an amputation of this right
upper extremity, with approximately a fiveinch, as we call it, stump, with some irregularity of the soft tissues over the boned
ends, and some tightness and pressure over
these parts and to the end of the stump.
There is still some redness of the scar here,
which indicates irritation.

Q.

Now, Doctor, the plaintiff has indicated that
after the first operation, there was a second

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.
A.

Do you know what that operation
Yes, sir.

operation~

was~
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Q. \Yill you explain to the jury what the nature
of that operation was~
A.

There was persistent drainage following the
first operation, and his physician felt it
necessary to explore and remove some pieces
of dead bone, and to trim the bone contour,
make it a better stwnp, *"

And eontinuing at Record, page 231:

"Q. Now, regarding the- I think you indicated that the arm has not healed as yet1
A.

That is correct.

Q. \\; ould you give us your prognosis as to that;
what you expect to see in the future1
A.

\Veil, I feel that there will still be another
operation necessary.''

And, in regard to pain and suffering, he testified (R.
232, 233):

"Q. I see. Now, Doctor, in regard to-I withdraw that. Do you know whether he is suffering from any pains as a result of his
present condition 1
A.

I have an opinion.

Q.

Will you give that opinion 1

A.

Yes, sir; I believe that he still has some
pain in his stump.

Q. He testified here, Doctor, that when he moved
his arm, he felt like he had an electric shock
enter his body1
A. Yes, sir.
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that~

Q.

Could you explain

A.

In amputations, we sometimes have impingement of the nerve or little nerve growth
called neuroma, which will cause touches of
pain. It may or may not be permanent.

Q.

You sa.y it may or may not be permanent?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

You can't give us an opinion as to whether
it will or will not~

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Doctor, have you an opinion as to what disability he suffered from this arm injury'

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

What~

A.

One hundred per cent of his right upper
extremity.

Q.

When you say 'one hundred per cent of his
right upper extremity,' you mean the right
arm~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

In its

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

You have experience-have you had experience here in this territory with artificial
arms that are supplied in this area to men
who had amputations~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Have you an opinion, from your experience,
as to whether or not an artificial arm could

entirety~
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be provided in this territory which would
give him any help~
A.

He can be fitted with a limb that will fill
out the contour of his clothing, but will not
be very practical as a functioning unit."
(c)

THE TABLES.

WILLIA~I

E. ~tfYRICK, Trust Officer of the First
Security Trust Company, who had qualified as an investment analyst and as an expert in the investment
field, stated as follows (R. 186, 187) :

'' Q. From your experience and training and the
knowledge gained from observation in reading market reports and the like, will ask
you to state if you have any opinion as to
the highest rate of return that a person of
ordinary prudence, without special training
in investment field, could hope to obtain on
safe investments here in this part of the
country?
A.

Yes, I have an opinion.

Q.

You have an opinion; will you state it, please?

It is my opinion that investor investing funds
where he doesn't have training or experience
would adhere to pur.chasing investments of
high investment rating, preferably bonds.
With such types of investments in the present market, his return would vary somewhere
between two and a half and three per cent,
depending on the diversification as to type
of security and maturities that were selected.''
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RAY G. WOOD, a Certified Public Accountant,
testified that he had prepared Exhibit "G'' and that
in doing so he had used the American Experience Tables
of Mortality for the purpose of determining the life
expectancy of the attained age group, age 26 (R. 236,
237), and that the tables indica ted a life expectancy
of such group to be 38.12 years, which reduced to months
was 457 months, and that in making the compilation he
used and employed information contained in said tables,
and used and employed discount rates of 234, 3, 3lf2, 4, 5,
and 6%, and that he had used annuity per month payments of $1, $10, $25, $50, $100, $200, and $300. He likewise testified that the exhibit was mathematically correct
(R. 238, 244) and that he had cross-checked and tested the
mathematical accuracy of the tables (R. 246).
Mr. Wood further testified (R. 256) that he had
used a hook published by the Financial Publishing Company containing compound interest and annuity tables
and that the book was used by the First Security Trust
Company of Salt Lake City in computing interest and
annuities and that he had spot-checked them with other
books that are used by certified public accountants and
that they checked and were in agreement.

He also

used a book known as ''Mathematics of Finance'' by
McKenzie, published by McGraw Hill Book Company,
and that he had examined the mathematical formula
used in the computation of figures and tables and that
it was accurate. From his own examination and calSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
culations he was willing to state that the tables were
mathematically correct and that they truthfully and
properly reflect the true state of facts with reference
to the present value of the amounts stated, discounted
at the amounts stated, over the periods of time stated.
Upon this foundation Exhibit "G" was received in
evidence (R. 258).
On cross-examination (R. 260) he stated that he
had checked the Accountants' Handbook approved by
the American Institute of Accountants against the information contained in ''Mathematics of Finance'' by
McKenzie, the book used in the preparation of Exhibit
"G" and they were in agreement.

He further testi-

fied that the mathematical tables were standard and
that they were used by actuaries (R. 261). The witness
likewise, on voir dire examination (R. 266), stated that
he had proved the table and that he could prove it
"right now." The Court asked Mr. Wood the following question (R. 267):
''THE COURT : Did I understand you to say
that there is a standard work accepted by
people in your profession as such 1
A.

Oh, yes; yes, sir.

THE COURT : I don't believe you made that
statement with resp/ect to the other book,
which you may have done; is it so that this
other book referred to-would you give us
titleFunding
to it,
Mr. McCarthy
1 of Museum and Library Services
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MR. l\icCARTHY:

Mathematics of Finance.

THE COURT: -is likewise a standard work
used by people in your profession for the
purposes which you use it in connection with
these computations~
A.

Yes, sir.''

Mr. Wood stated that he had likewise prepared
Exhibit "H" and in connection with that exhibit stated
as follows (R. 271, 272):
''A.

The tables referred to on Exhibit H are taken
from a publication called UNITED STATES
LIFE TABLES, covering the years 1939 to
1941. These were published-or this was
published-by the Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census in Washington, D. C.

Q. "\Vhen was it

published~

A.

January the 11th, 1944.

Q.

And do you know whether or not the information contained there was prepared by
the Department of Commerce of the United
States Government?

A.

That's my understanding.

Q.

The tables that you have, that were published by the United States Department of
Commerce, are they broken down more completely than the tables in the American Experience Tables of Mortality for white males
and white females and-

A.

Black.
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Q. -and colored and so forth 1
~\..

Yes, sir.

Q. And do you know whether or not the basis
of the table includes all of the citizens of
eYery kind, and of all professions and all
occupations t
A.

That is the explanation of the table. They
cover all people within the group born alive.

Q. All those that are born alive ; do the tables
show anything with respect to the life expectancy of the 26-year-old adult age group
of white males 1
A.

According to these tables, a person who is
a ·white male, who has attained the age of
26 years, has 42.38 average number of years
of life remaining to him.

Q. Have you used that life expectancy, 42.38
years in a compilation of the figures set
forth in Exhibit H1
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And that amounts to, as I understand it,
509 months1
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. Now, in preparing the compilation on Exhibit H, did you use the same sources of annuity information that you have described
to the court and jury in connection with Exhibit G1
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And do you know whether or not the tables,
Exhibit H, are mathematically correct 1
A. Yes, sir, they are."
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SUMMARY OF RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT
IN ANSWER TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE WAS AMPLY SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S FINDING OF LIABILITY UNDER DOCTRINES ANNOUNCED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES AND BY THIS COURT.

POINT II.
BEFORE THE VERDICT CAN BE VACATED DEFENDANT MUST ESTABLISH THAT IT WAS SO EXCESSIVE AS
TO APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE AND THAT THE
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

POINT III.
EXHIBITS "G" AND "H" WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE AND THE FOUNDATIONAL BASIS
FOR SAID EXHIBITS WAS AMPLE AND SUFFICIENT
UNDER THE AUTHORITIES.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE WAS AMPLY SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S FINDING OF LIABILITY UNDER DOCTRINES ANNOUNCED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES AND BY THIS COURT.

The evidence in this case, without dispute, reveals
that plaintiff stationed himself on top of the fourteenth
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car from the locomotiYe ·where it was necessary for him
to be in order to pass Yisible signals to the engineer.
The engineer was operating the engine and train upon
signals from plaintiff. Unless an obstruction appeared
on the track creating an emergency, the engineer would
not be expected to stop or slow down suddenly ·except
in res·ponse to a compelling signal from plaintiff or
another member of the crew. The evidence reveals, without any dispute whatsoever, that neither the plaintiff nor
any 'Other member of the crew gave a ''stop'' or ''slow
down'' signal to the engineer at or near the time when
plaintiff was thrown from his position on the car.
\Yhile plaintiff was \Yalking forward and stooping
over to grasp the handhold on top of the car preparatory to dismounting, he was dislodged and thrown from
the car as the direct result of a violent jerking of the
train.
The plaintiff, 1n describing the movement, stated
(R. 184):
''A.

A violent running in and a run out. There is a
down-grade and when he puts the air to these
cars, he used the independent air; when he
;puts the air to the diesel, ·the diesel is the
only braking power he had; in other words,
that he used. Up and down hill grade, and
going at the speed he was going, and the
weight of the diesel, as heavy as it is, when
he puts the air to that, if he puts too much,
why there will be a violent slack action running in on the cars.''
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The engineer and the fireman testified that a violent jerk of the car could only occur as a direct result
of some manipulation on the part of the engineer. The
jury, as required by its oath under the evidence, found
that there was a sudden, unexpected, entirely unnecessary jerking of the car which resulted in plaintiff's terrible injuries.
Defendant has not seriously dis puted liability in this
case, although belittling certain recent decisi·ons of the
Supreme Court of the United S.tates which are here controlling. However, in order that there may be absolutely
no doubt as to the strength of plaintiff's case on liability, we wish to review controlling authorities. This court
has consistently held that a sudden, severe and unexpected jerk in the movement of a train causing a member of the train crew to suffer injury or death, constitutes negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
1

Ward v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R. Co., 96 Utah 564,
85 P. (2d) 837, plaintiff brought action for the wrongful
death of her husband under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. She complained that by reason of a sudden
and unexpected decrease in the speed of the cut upon
which her husband was riding and resulting jerk, he was
thrown from the car upon which he was stationed and
fatally injured. There was no eyewitness who could or
did testify that there was a sudden jerk. Expert witnesses were produced who testified that a jerk could
reasonably be expected from the movement of a cut of
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cars as described by other witnesses. The court, after
reviewing the evidence stated:

'' * * * The jury could conclude that there
negligence in slowing down the cars too
quickly after they had acquired a s,peed too fast
to permit hin1 to make the cut ,as they passed him.
The speed was in response to his signals. The
foreman knew, or should have known, that Ward
was upon the cars; \Yard's duty called him there
in obedience to the foreman's orders. He knew,
or should have known, that Ward was in a position of danger; that a quick, or too rapid, slowing of the cars might throw him off, by reason
of the momentum of the cars; that the slack running through the cars would heighten the risk
and the danger. He also knew, or should have
known, that \Yard would not anticipate any slowing or jerking of the cars at 'Such juncture.
\H1S

''Under the evidence in the record, it eannot
be said, as matter of law, that there was no evidential support for the jury's conclusion that the
sudden slowing of the cars jerked Ward off the
train and that such jerking was negligence. That
there was no eyewitness as to when Ward actually
reached the top of the end car, or when he went
off of it, is not a sufficient objection. Facts and
circumstances often speak more convincingly than
words.''
The trial court instructed the jury as follows :

" * * * if you find from the evidence that
Ward was directed by the foreman to climb the
cars in question; that he did so in obedience to
said directions; that he fell from one of the cars
by
reason
ofFunding
an unusual
or unexpected
slowing
ofServices
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the movement, if such was the •proximate cause
of the accident, it would constitute negligence on
the part of defendant for which the plaintiff
would have the right to recover damage."
Appellant complained of this instruction and assigned it as error on the ground "(1) that it is not unlawful, in the absence of a sta~tute or ordinance, to slow
down cars in switching them.'' But this court held that
the objection was not well taken and stated:
"In order that an a0t may be negligent because imprudent, in the circumstances, such act
need not also be unlawful because prohibited by
statute or ordinance.''
In the case of J( eeton v. Thompson, 66 S. Ct. 135,
reversing the Supreme Court of Arkansas, 183 S. W.
( 2d) 505, action was brought for wrongful death under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act and amongst other
things the complaint alleged that the intestate, while
working as a conductor on defendant's train ~through the
negligence of defendant and its engineer, was knocked
off and caused to fall from said train and fatally injured; that deceased was riding upon one of the cars of
said train while it was being moved and the engineer,
knowing deceased was on the train, carelessly and negligently and without signal 'Or warning suddenly and
violently stopped the engine and the cars with a hard,
sudden, violent and unusual jerk and jar, thereby throwing deceased from the ·train. The tdal court submitted
the issues to the jury. The Supreme Court of Arkansas
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reversed and the Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari and reversed the State Supreme
Court.

The facts are interesting here and for ~that reason
will be set forth in considerable detail. The crew with
which intestate was working when injured was engaged
in switching cars from Braggs, Oklahoma, to Camp Gruber, a distance of about a mile and a half, and consisted of an engineer, fireman, deceased the conductor,
and .two brakemen; at the time of the accident the crew
was pushing six cars of sand and gravel ahead of the
engine and deceased was riding on the fifth car ahead
of the engine, sitting astride of the right or south side
of an ordinary coal car on the forward end with one
foot on the gravel and the 'Other on a grab-iron on the
outside with a switch list in one hand and ·a lighted lantern in the other. On the way down they had to pick up
an empty car which necessitated the making of .a coupling to the forward loaded car; in making the coupling,
intestate fell from the car on which he was riding, resulting in his injury and death. Each and every member
of the train crew except Keeton testified that the train
was brought to a complete stop about a hu!ldred feet
from the empty car and that thereafter the engine pushed
the loaded cars up to the empty :to make the coupling at
a rate of one or two miles per hour at ·the signal of
brakeman Vaughn; and that the_ coupling was very light
and easy and not out of the ordinary in any way. The
(:
engineer and fireman testified that it was so easy th8!t
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tified that he gave the signal to the engineer to proceed
to the empty after walking to it and gave the easy signal
when the front car was about 50 feet away, and that by
the easy signal the engineer knew they wanted him to
slow down; that he gave the stop signal when the train
was about three or four feet from ~the empty and the
engineer ·stopped as soon as possible and he went about
two feet after the coupling. He ·said the stop was a very
ordinary one with a slight jar. When asked on crossexamination if this coupling was about as hard as he
ever saw the engineer make, he answered, ''No sir, it
was a very ordinary one." A little later, in answer to
a question whether the stop was the hardest he ever
saw him make there, he answered: "Yes, sir."
The ·widow testified, over appellant's objections and
exceptions to a statement made to her by her husband,
as a dying declaration. She said: "He realized that he
was very sick and told me he wasn't going to get well.
He told me how it happened; he said he was sitting on
the corner and there was a sudden stop -and he was
jerked off. He was sitting on the corner of the car with
a switch list in one hand and ·a light in the other; ·there
was a sudden stop. After he was jerked off, he knew
nothing more ; just said there was a sudden hard stop
and he wa<S jerked off.''
The Supreme
ion which shows
question as close
the cause upon a
of that court.

Court of the United St·ates in an opinthat this court did not regard the
or doubtful, reversed and remanded
mere citation of controlling decisions
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This court, in Ayres v. Union Pacific R. Co., _______ _
Utah --------, 176 P. (2d) 161, reviewing in considerable
detail the Ward case and the Keeton case, ·supported
those cases in definite language. In that ease plaintiff,
in the performance of his duties, wa:s boarding a caboose
when he fell across the rails in the path of the moving
caboose and his right hand was crushed by its wheels.
A washout signal was given by the foreman when he saw
plaintiff fall and the caboose was brought to a quick
stop. Plaintiff described his accident as follows: ''there
was a jerk, a sudden ·stop or something and off I went.''
He testified that he was firmly established on the step
at the time, grasping grab-irons to hold himself on. The
other crew members denied that there was such a je;rk or
stop, and the foreman who saw the accident said the fall
happened in the plaintiff '.s fumbling efforts to get upon
the step without raising his foot high enough. The undisputed te·stimony was that there was no reason, so f·ar
as the movement of ·the engine and cabooses was concerned, for ·stopping or jerking the train at the moment
when the accident occurred.
It \Yas contended that plaintiff, in order to prevail,
must have shown the cause of the jerk and that ·such
cause evinced negligence upon defendant's part. This
court rejected defendant's contention in the f·ollowing
language:
" 'Unexpeeted' or 'unanticipated' is measured in the light of what was the normal performance of the duty involved, and a jerk or stop
is unexpected or unanticipated when it was not
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reasonably to be expected as part of the normal
performance of that duty. We do not adopt the
suggestion that has been made, inferentially at
least, that the mere happening of the jerk or stop
is sufficient proof to submit to the jury, but when
the jerk ·Or stop is characterized by tes,timony taking it out of the normal incident to the performance of the duty involved, it becomes an issue for
the jury to determine. The Ward case, this case,
and ·the Keeton case are examples of jerks and
stops that vary from the normal.''
See also Western & Atlantic R. Co . v. Gardner, 74 Ga.
App. 499, 40 S. E. (2d) 672.
It is clear that the jerk in the case at bar was unexpected and unanticipated, was clearly characterized
by all of the evidence as not being ''the normal incident
to the performance of the duty involved.''
It is respectfully submitted that defendant was liable to plaintiff for his injuries and that the finding of
the jury ·on this issue was consis•tent with the proof and
that the proof furnished a strong evidentiary basis for
the verdict.
POINT II.
BEFORE THE VERDICT CAN BE VACATED DEFENDANT MUST ESTABLISH THAT IT WAS SO EXCESSIVE AS
TO APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE AND THAT THE
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

The fundamental proposition raised by defendant in
its Point III is that an excessive verdict was returned
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in this case. Whether this court will interfere with the
:verdict upon this ground has been considered in many
cases and governing rules have been definitely established. In Pa~tly u. JlcCarthy et al, 166 Pac. (2d) 501,
67 S. Ct. 102, 184 P. (2d) 123; 109 Utah 398, 436, the rule
is stated:
"Where we can say, as a matter of law, that
the verdict was so excessive as to appear to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice, and the trial court abused its discretion or
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a motion for a new trial, we may order the verdict set
aside, and a new trial granted. Jensen v. D. & R.
G. Ry. Co., supra; and other cases cited above
following that decision. But mere excessiveness
of a 'Terdict, without more, does not necessarily
show that the verdict was arrived at by passion
or prejudice. Stephens Ranch & Livestock Co. v.
U. P. Ry. Co., supra. It is true that ·the verdict
might be so grossly excessive and disproportionate to the injury that we could say from that fact
alone that as a matter of law the verdict must
have been arrived at by passion or ·prejudice. But
the facts must be such that the excess can be determined as a matter of law, or the verdict must
be so excessive as to be shocking to one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice,
or corruption on the part of the jury. McAfee v.
Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., supra; Ward v.
D. & R. G. w·. Ry. Co., ·supra. This is not such a
case.
''The verdict here was admittedly liberal. But
the mere fact that it was more than another
jury, or more than this court might have given, or
even more than the evidence justified, does not
conclusively show that it was the resul·t of pas-
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sion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of
the jury. * * *
"The jury is allowed great latitude in assessing damages for personal injuries. Miller v.
So. Pac. Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P. 2d 865. The present cost of living and the diminished rpurchasing
power of the dollar may be taken into consideration when estimating damages. Coke v. Timby,
57 Utah 53, 192 P. 624; McAfee v. Ogden Union
Ry. & Depot Co., supra.''
It is with great reluctance that courts interfere
with the verdict of juries on the ground of excessiveness.
In the Pauly case this court pointed out: ''But, although
we have the power to order a new trial in a case of an
excessive verdict, it is a power which we have rarely, if
ever, exercised.''
Traditionally courts have adhered to ,the proposition that the trial court trying the issues and hearing
the testimony is the proper tribunal for determining
whether or not the jury's verdict is excessive. The trial
court exercises a discretionary power over the amount
of the verdict and the rule is stated in 15 Am. Jur. 622,
Damages, Sec. 205, as follows:
''The question of the excessiveness of a verdict is generally one for the determination of the
trial court in the first instance, and its action
in granting or refusing to grant a new trial on
that ground will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown.''
The defendant in this case invoked the exercise of
this discretionary power of the trial court. One of the
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grounds urged by them in their motion for new trial was
the excessiYeness of the verdict. The trial court denied
the motion for a new trial thereby ·placing its ~stamp of
approval upon the verdict as rendered. As stated in
Stephens Rauclz & Livestock Co. v. Union Pac .. R. Co.,
48 Utah 528, 161 Pac. 459 at 462:

'' * * * Necessarily upon such a quesHon appell&te courts must, to a large extent, rely upon
the judgment and discretion of the trial court.
That court is in a much better position to observe
and determine whether a jury was actuated by
passion or prejudice, 'Or by both, in returning a
· verdict for an amount larger than the evidence
justifies, or whether the jury was merely mistaken ''ith regard to the amount that should have
been allowed.''
Hence, when defendant came to this court asserting
that the verdict is greater than the evidence justifies it
has the burden of convincing that the damages awarded
were so excessive as to indicate that they were given
under the influence of passion or prejudice and that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion
for a new trial.
It has always been ·our position that $50,000 is a very
moderate sum of money to compensate a young man, 26
years of age, for the loss of his right arm at the shoulder. This case could not have been settled for that figure
bef·ore trial. The court will observe that a monthly annuity of $200, discounted at the rate of 234% interest
over plaintiff's life expectancy of 42.38 years as shown
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by the United States Life Tables 1939 and 1941, Department of Commerce, is $60,053.76, and the jury could well
have found that plaintiff's pecuniary loss over his life
expectancy was much greater than a sum based upon a
$200 per month diminution of earning capacity. We believe that under the authorities, hereinafter cited, a sum
of $50,000 for plaintiff's pain ~nd suffering, loss of bodily function and disfigurement alone, would not have
been excessive.
In Whittington v. Pennsylvania R. Co .., (New York,
July 6, 1944) 55 F. Supp. 1022, 1023, plaintiff was at the
time of hi~s injuries 39 years of age and steadily employed as an automobile mechanic, earning approximately $3,000 a year. His injuries consisted of amputation of
the left arm, together with a comminuted fracture of the
eleventh rib near the spine, an impacted fracture of the
twelfth dorsal vertebra, some paralysis in and about the
thighs and buttocks, and serious impairment of organs
of his body. The court, in supporting a jury verdict in
the amount of $60,000, stated:
''Reference to the 'Present Value Table,'
published in Cahill's New York Civil Practice
Act, discloses that the present value of an ~annu
ity of $1, payable at the end of each year at 3%
~per annum compounded over a period of thirty
years, which wa~s his life expectancy, is $19.60. At
$3,000 a year the amount would be $58,800, which
is very close to the verdict of $60,000. That sum,
thus arrived at, would he without inclusion of
pain and suffering and the other elements ~that I
have enumerated above.''
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Armentrout t'. rirginia Ry. Co., C\V. Va., Aug. 16,
1947) 72 F. Supp. 997, 1001, 1003. Plaintiff was a four
year old boy: his injuries consisted of loss of both arms,
one above the wrist and the other above the elbow. The
case was tried before a jury and a verdict rendered in
favor of the plaintiff f.or $160,000. The court, in supporting the jury's verdict, discussed extensively the various elements of damage, calling attention to the low purchasing power of money and detailed a computation of
figures estimating the loss suffered by plaintiff over his
life expectancy. It will be noted that the plaintiff was not
entitled to recover for lost wages exc~pt for ,those years
after he had reached ·the age of 21. The court stated :
''In seeking to discover whether or not the
jury were actuated by any im'Proper motives in
arriving at the ·amount of the verdict, we should
attempt to measure the monetary value of the different elements of damage which were proper for
their consideration; bearing in mind the decreased
value of the dollar, which has nome about very
rapidly during the past few years.
"The attention of the jury was not specifically directed to the low purchasing power of
money, although in my opinion such a suggestion
by the Court would have been proper, and certainly the jury were entitled to take that circumstance jnto consideration. It may be argued that
ordinary fluctuations in the purchasing power of
money may not pro·perly be considered by a jury
in awarding damages. Perhaps not, as ·to the future; but the jury have the right, and it is their
duty, to be realistic. They need not close their
eyes to the economic facts of life. It is possible,
of course, that values may cease to be affected
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by inflation of the currency. Economic conditions
may conceivably cause the value of the dollar
again to rise to the point where it stood before
World War II. On the 'Other hand, there is no
assurance that its value may not become less as
time goes on. This possibility balances, if it does
not outweigh, the contrary forecast. It would be,
I think, mere speculation to adopt either ~theory
as the foundation of an estimate of future earnings. Yet some reasonable and logical basis for
such an estimate must be found; and, in my opinion, it can be found only by an appraisal of present economic facts, of which -the jury are presumed to have knowledge. No one can say now
whether a verdict of $160,000 rendered today may
be equivalent to one of $300,000 or to one of $80,000 rendered five years hence. We can be guided
only by the conditions of the present; and under
those conditions, we learn from economic statistics that $160,000 now represents a value of a:pproximately $100,000 in 1939. See Monthly Labor
Review, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, May 1947, p. 879, table
No. 1; West Virginia Department of Labor Cost
of Living Survey, 1947 Prices (Spring) Compared
with 1940 Prices (Spring) Percent Increase Over
1940.
''The jury could, wi·thout overstepping the
bounds of their province, suppose for ·plaintiff
a maximum expectancy of 60¥2 years from the
date of the verdict. This conclusion is based both
on statements made by counsel during the trial,
which were not denied or contradicted, and also
upon a mortality table published by one of the
large life insurance companies. See Commissioners 1941 Standard Ordinary Mortality Table, The
Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, Newark,
N. J. By this mortality table the expectancy of a
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child 4 years old is 60.58 years. While the jury
were not bound to consider mortality tables, they
did have the right to do so, and by the fullest extension of that right they could base their verdict, in my opinion, on ·the full length of expectancy provided in the mortality table as expressed
to them by counsel in the course of the trial.
"'With these ~principles in mind I proceed to
analyze the jury's verdict in the light of the maximum factors which might properly have gone into
its synthesis. I say maximum fact·ors because I
believe that to be the proper te·st after ·the jury
has acted. Since the jury had the power to extend
their discretion to its utmost bounds, any less
than the greatest would not be a fair test as to
whether or not that power was abused.
''If by such a test the verdict is found to be
so excessive that it cannot be justified, it should
be set aside and a new trial granted, or it should
be reduced by remittitur to an amount which will
not exceed the amount of the product of the
maximum factors. Otherwise, it should be sustained as rendered by the jury.''

It would be of distinct interest to the court to examine
the extensive figures set forth in the ·opinion of this
case indicating ·the exact method of computing the loss
suffered. It will also be of interest to note that the court
considered the sum of $50,000 a maximum reasonable
amount to which the jury might find the plaintiff entitled for pain and suffering, loss of bodily funct1on and
disfigurement which he had suffered and would suffer
and endure as a result of his injury.
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Plaintiff, in the case at bar, suffered the loss of only
one arm. However, it was within the jury's province as
finders of the fact and based upon their own e~perience
as to the business and labor opportunities of a man who
has lost his right arm to determine whether or not plaintiff might potentially be able to earn more than plaintiff in the Armentrout case, and it must be borne in mind
that plaintiff in this case is not well educated; he is a
young man whose sole experience consists of work involving physical labor and the use of two normal, healthy
arms and hands. His chances of continuing his employment as a railroader have been eliminated.
See Shields et al v. United States (Pa. Mar. 18, 1947)
73 F. Supp. 862.

Bartlebaugh v. Pa. R. Co., 78 N. E. (2d) 410 (Ohio
App. 1948), appeal dismissed, 79 N. E. (2d) 912 (Surpreme Court of Ohio, 1948). Plaintiff was employed as
a brakeman by defendant company and was injured in
the course of his employment because of inadequrute
clearance between adjacent tracks. He lost both legs,
each being amputated above the knee, the one leaving
a stump of four inches, and the other, of eight inches
from the body. The jury found the issues in .favor of
plaintiff and rendered a verdict for $225,000. The defendant on appeal assigned as error that the damages
awarded plaintiff were grossly excessive appearing to
have been given under the influence of sympathy, emotion, passion or prejudice, and that the amount of damages is not sustained by the evidence. It appeared that
the plantiff was a young man, 23 years of age at the
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date of trial and had a life expectancy of 44.77 years.
The court, in sustaining the verdict, ·stated:
''Is the award of damages exce.ssive ~ The
appellant contends that the damages awarded are
grossly excessive appearing to have been given
under the influence of sympathy, emotion, passion or prejudice ; the amount of the damages is
not sustained by the evidence and is contrary to
la,·L We have under consideration a general verdict without interrogatories. We are not informed
as to how the jury arrived at the total award of
damages. Even if the Court should be of the opinion that on the evidence adduced a lesser amount
would have been proper, nevertheless the Court
cannot ·substitute its judgment for that of the
jury. 30 0. Jur. pp.124, 127; Delaney v. New York
Central, supra. Before the Court can find the
damages awarded to be excessive, it must appear
that the award is so excessive as to manifestly
show the jury was actuated by pas·sion, pa.rtiality, prejudice or corruption. The damages must
bQ flagrantly outrageous and extravag,a.nt, otherwise the Court may not disturb the verdict. 30 0.
Jur. Section 79, p. 122; Jones v. Adantic Refining Co., supra.

.-

"In arriving at its verdict it was the duty
of the jury to consider several elements of damage which the plaintiff ·suffered: First, the plaintiff's earning power. It cannot be assumed that
his earning tpower would not increase in future
years. On the evidence adduced the jury had a
right, to and probably did, f.ind that the earning
power of the plantiff would Increase. Second, for
pain and .suffering. The plaintiff had at lea;st two
operations on his legs which caused him to be
hospitalized for a period of several months. The
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testimony is that he suffered great pain several
months succeeding the injury and still suffers
some pain and may continue to suffer pain during his entire lifetime. Third, future surgical
operations. The evidence shows that thus far he
has been unable to use artificial limbs due to the
condition of the nerves in the stumps of his legs
and that surgery on the nerves will be necessary to allevia~te this condition; that the stumps
of his legs must be reshwped in order to be refitted with artificial limbs. There is medical testimony to the effect that because of the length
of ~the stumps he may never be able to use artificial limbs. According to medical testimony, at
least two and perhaps three painful, expensive,
surgical operations will be required with uncertain results. Fourth, that in all probability he will
always be in need of the services of an attendant.
Fifth, loss of earnings from the date of injury to
the date of trial. Sixth, and it has been held in
Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U. S. 485,
60 L. Ed. 1117, that adequate allowance should
be made 'for the earning power of money' which
refers to the interest rate at which the principal
sum may be discounted. The interest rate ha;s
heretofore been discussed.
''There is no fixed standard by which to
measure the damages for pain and suffering,
mental anguish or shock to the nervous system or
humiliation. Such mat~ters rest in ~the sound judgment of the jury. The Court gave complete and
pro,per instructions to the jury on all these elements of damage. It must be presumed that the
jury followed the instructions of the Court. If
the jury, in giving the evidence presented on behalf of the plaintiff a construction most favorable
to him, which it had a right to do, under the instructions of the Court, could have arrived at
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the verdict in the amount awarded, and if there
is substantial evidence to sustain the verdict, i~t
will not be disturbed. Jones v. Atlantic Refining
Co., supra.
''"'here the jury in arriving at the amount
of the verdict could not be said to have disregarded the Court's instructions, even though the
Court might disagree with respect t·o the amount
awarded, the Court cannot disturb the verdict on
the ground that it is excessive. Delaney v. New
York Central, supra. Verdicts in similar eases are
not controlling in determining whether the verdict under consideration is excessive and, therefore, no comparisons will be made. The amount
of damages awarded is not so excessive as to
show that the jury was actuated by sympathy,
emotion, passion or prejudice. The amount awarded is sustained by sufficient evidence and is
not contrary to law."

,_.

G01.trley v. Chicago & E. I. Ry. Co., (Ill. May 3, 1938)
14 N. E. (2d) 842. The Appellate Court held that the
jury's verdict of $80,000 for injuries to a 55 year old
railroad engineer who had both hands crushed necessitating the amputation of his left arm above the wrist
and part of his right hand, and who ~suffered infection
and whose injuries were not healed at the trial two and
a half years after the accident, whose average earnings
were $3,000 annually and who had a reasonable life expectancy of 15 years, was excessive by $20,000.
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hargrove (Apr. 27,
1948) 35 So. (2d) 1. A jury awarded $50,000 in damages to a 43 year old lineman for severe electric burns
that required removal of the right hand and forearm
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and several skin grafts on the right leg was held not
to be excessive where it appeared that the lineman had
earned $6,500 a year prior to his injuries; that his life
expectancy was 25 years, that he was no longer able to
work as a lineman and lacked training for any other employment. The Oourt, in supporting the verdict, stated:

'' * * * The elements that enter into a judgment like this are so diverse that it often requires
more of humility than it does of law properly to
assess them. The Judge who ·Overlooks the fact
that the lineman, the yardman, the plumber, and
the cook are made of the same common cl'ay that
he is, is not equipped to do so.''
Howard v. Baltimore & 0. C. T. R. Co. (Ill. Nov. 6,
1945) 327 Ill . .&pi?· 83, 63 N. E. (2d) 774. The court
upheld a verdict of $50,000 for a 51 year old switchman
who suffered severe scalp wounds leaving a disfiguring
scar and amputation of one arn1. The Court stated:
"We have often recognized, in passing upon
the amount of damages awarded, the decline in
the purchasing power of money.''

* • * * * * * *
"After careful consideration of the evidence
bearing upon defendant's contention that 'the
verdict was f,or an excessive amount' we are satisfied that we would not be justified in disturbing
the amount awar~ed by the jury.''

Oban et al v. Stoll (Ill. May 7, 1946) 328 Ill. App.
398, 66 N. E. (2d) 316. The Court held that a verdict
of $50,000 to a 48 year old tool maker earning some
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$3,700 per year who suffered a fracture of the pelvis
and of the neck and pubic bone on the left side, who
suffered concussion of the brain, remaining in a state
of shock for a long time, who was operated on for removal for part of an intestine, and whose left leg became four and one-half inches shorter and two-thirds
the size of his right limb, was not excessive.

Greenberg et al 'V. Garfield-Passaic Bus Co. et al.,
(Xew Jersey, July 24, 1946) 48 Atl. (2d) 389. Verdi~ts,
awarding $50,000 damages for past and future suffering
of a previously active 55 year old housewife as a result of injuries necessitated amputation of both legs below the knees, £or $35,000 to her husband for cost of her
care, loss of services and his out of pocket expenses were
held to be not excessive. The Court stated :
''The verdict in favor of Mrs. Greenberg of
$50,000 as compensation for the pain and suffering which she has and will suffer as a result of
the accident seems to us not ·to be exces~sive."

A vance v. Thompson (Ill.' Oct. 30, 1943) 320 Ill.
A.pp. 406, 51 N. E. (2d) 334. In a'n action by a 22 year old
brakeman to recover against the railroad under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries resulting in
amputation of his right leg three inches above the knee
and of his left leg four inches below the knee, an award
of $125,000 remitted by the trial court to $100,000 was
held not to be excessive.
Cooksey v. Atchison, T . & 8. F. Ry. Co. (Gal. Mar.
11, 1947) 178 P. (2d) 69, 72. A verdict of $42,000 to a
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54 year old conductor who was earning $6,000 annually
and had a life expectancy of 17 years for serious permanent back injuries requiring the wearing of a steel brace
and which might develo,p into kyphosis, wrist fracture,
and heel injury which would likely be permanent and
would cause pain and physical discomfort, was held not
to be excessive. The Court stated:

'' * * * At the time of the injury his salary
was about $6,000 annually, and he had a life expectancy of approximately 17 years. Damages
must be determined according to the circumstances of each particular case. It is true, as appellant asserts, that a consideration of the
amounts awarded as damages in previous cases
is of value in determining IYhether an award is
excessive, but it is also true that consideration
should he given to differences in economic conditions prevailing when the awards were made.
For a discussion of the rule that notice may be
taken of the differences in the purchasing power
of money at different times, and that such notice
should be taken in making an a ward of damages,
reference is made to Foster v. Pestana, supra, 77
Cal. _Aipp. 2d ........ , 177 P. 2d 54, 59."
Carrano v. Red Star Transit Co., Inc. (Pa. Nov. 18,
1943) 58 F. Supp. 643, 644. The Court supported averdict of $37,284 to plaintiff for serious and permanent
injury to his left elbow. The Court stated:
''The verdict was large, considering the lack
of right on the part of plaintiff to practice medicine. On the other hand, the plaintiff was seriously injured. His left elbow (he is left-handed)
was completely de,stroyed, the accident leaving
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him with a 'flail' joint. The case disclosed a history of long and excessive pain, which persisted
after a very expensive 0 pera tion to remove a
growth at the end of a severed main nerve of the
arm. Even some doubt was thrown upon amputation of the arm as a cure f·or this pain. Under
these circumstances the verdict, though large, is
not so grossly excessive as to demand retrial.''
1

The Court may be interested in Federal District
Judge Louis E. Goodman's Order Denying Motion for
New Trial in the case of Guthrie, plaintiff, vs. Southern
Pacific Company, defendant, recently tried in the United
States District Court for the N·orthern District of California, Southern Division, No. 28106-G, which is as follows:
''ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL
''I am of the opinion that I fairly and properly instructed the jury in this case.
The jury could well have concluded from the
evidence that plaintiff's injury was proximately
caused by negligence of defendant and the crew
of the locomotive which ran over and cut off
plaintiff's leg, and, further, that plaintiff was
himself free of any contributory negligence.

~:

The verdict of $100,000.00 damages was large.
But not so large as to shock the court's sense of
justice. True, it is larger than I might have
awarded. On that ground, however, I may not set
it aside. Jones v. Atlantic Refining Co., 55 Fed.
Supp. 17; Delaney v. New York Central R. R.
Co., 68 Fed. Supp. 70.
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Plaintiff was a 58 year old locomotive engineer with a working lifetime of railroad experience. He had a working expectancy of 12 years
and a life expectancy of 15 years. His leg, amputated between knee and thigh, wa,s fully incapacitating. It may be fairly concluded from the evidence that, while there might be a possibility in
the future of using an artificial limb, physical
conditions indicate such possibility to be most uncertain and even remote. Present value of loss of
future earnings is substantial - between $60,000
and $70,000. The amount of general damage rested in the discretion of the jury. In that domain,
reasonable minds could differ.
For these reasons, the motion for new trial
and for a diff~rent judgment is denied.
Dated: January 5, 1949.''
The court will observe that many of the verdicts
herein set f·orth were rendered and supported ,several
years ago, at times when the value of the dollar was
much greater than it is today. As was pointed out in
the Armentrout case, $160,000 in 1947 represented a
value of only $100,000 in 1939 according to United States
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and
the cost of living has increased considerably since the
Spring of 1947.
Oounsel for the defendant has characterized as infl.ammatory the ruling of the trial court in allowing the
plaintiff to exhibit his stump to the jury. Authorities
are legion to the effect that the trial court has a discretionary power in a personal injury action to permit
the exhibition of injured portions of a person's body to
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the jury and unless the exhibition is calculated to prejudice the jury it is in all respects proper. It is submitted
that the very best evidence as to the nature of an injury
is a view of the injury itself.

See 32 C.J.S. Sec. 610

where it is stated:
''Where an issue as to personal injuries or
disability is involved, the injured ~person may be
permitted to exhibit to the jury the wound 'Or injury, or the member or portion of his body on
which such wound or injury was inflicted, at least
if exhibition of the injured member is not calculated to prejudice the jury. Thus the eourt has
permitted the exhibition of an ankle, a knee, a
foot, a leg, an arm, a hand, an eyesocket, and
various other parts of the body. A similar exhibition may be made where the injury has resulted
in the death of the injured person or the loss of
a member or part of his body."

Jones on Evidence, Fourth Edition, Sec. 398, states
the rule:
''Real or demonstrative evidence is brought
to the knowledge of the trier of facts by means
of inspection or without the intervention of the
testimony of witnesses. A common case is where,
in an action for injury to the person, the plaintiff is permitted to exhibit the affected or injured part to the jury. Although it is objected
that such evidence cannot be preserved in the
record for review, and may tend unduly to prejudice or inflame the jury, the well-settled !practice in such a case is to permit the jury to see the
party's injuries. So doing is said to bring before
the jury a part of the res gestae, and to enable
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them to determine the nature and the character
of the injury in a more satisfactory manner than
by means of the description of witnesses."

Roy v. Oregon Short LineR. Co . , (S. Ct. Idaho, Mar.
28, 1935) 42 Pac. (2d) 476,478. Action was brought under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act to recover damage-s for loss of plaintiff's left ·arm below the elbow. The
Court, over objection of defense counsel, allowed the
plaintiff to show the stump of his arm to the jury. The
Supreme Court in affirming the lower court's ruling
in that regard stated:
"It is contended that the verdict is excessive,
and that the exhibition of respondent's arm, together with certain allegedly improper remarks of
counsel, was such as to strongly and improperly
excite the sympathies of the jury. The exhibition
of the ann, though unnecessary, since the nature
of the injury was admitted, was not so improper
as to be prejudicial. 22 C. J. 788-789; 'Stephens v.
Elliott, 36 1font. 92, 92 P. 45; City of Topeka v.
Bradshaw, 5 Kan. App. 879, 48 P. 751; Bowerman
v. Columbia Gorge Motor Coach System, 132 Or.
106, 284 P. 579; Sears v. Goldsmith, 136 Or. 151,
298 P. 219; Cook v. Danaher Lumber Co., '61
Wash. 118, 112 P. 245; Cunningham v. Union Pac.
Ry. Co., 4 Utah 206, 7 Pac. 795; Dunkin v. City
of Hoquiam, 56 Wash. 47, 105 P. 149; Faras v.
Lower Californja Deve}opment Go., 27 Cal. App.
688, 151 P. 35 ; Zelhaver v. Koepke, 260 Mich. 428,
245 N. W. 490; Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry. Co. of
Texas v. Foster (Tex. Civ. App.) 38 S. W. (2d)
391.''
See also 20 Am. J ur. Sec. 720.
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In Cnnningham. c. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 4 Utah 206,
7 Pac. 795, 798, the Court said:
"3. The court below permitted the plaintiff
to exhibit the injured foot to the jury, and this is
alleged to be an error. While, ·of course, the trial
court should be careful and not allow improper
matters to be broug·ht to the attention of the jury,
the exhibition of the injured foot can hardly be
called improper: for, as was said in the case of
:Jiulhado v. Railroad Co., 30 N. Y. 370,. Such exhibition certainly tended to make the
description of the injury more intelligible, and it
cannot be supposed that it could have had any undue influence upon the feelings or sympathies of
the jury. As well might it be contended that a_
man who had lost an arm or a leg by a similar injury should not be permitted to appear before a
jury and testify in relation to it, lest thereby
their feelings might be influenced, and, under the
undue excitement created thereby, they might do
injustice. We cannot assume that any :Such consequences will follow such a course of examination,
and we cannot perceive that it was objectionable
in the present instance.' See Whart. Ev. Sec.

346.''
Defense counsel in his brief states :

" * * * obviously the only purpose of the exhibition was to inflame the sym~pathy and stir the
prejudice of the jury.''
An interesting case which is no doubt fresh in the
mind and memory of each member of this Court is State
v._Moore (Utah) 183 P. 2d 973, where appellant, upon
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appeal from conviction of rape, claimed that he had
been prejudiced in his trial because the prosecutrix had
been permitted t·o continuously exhibit her legs, injuries
and all to the jury. The Court on page 977 stated:
''Counsel for appellant earnestly argue that
the court committed prejudicial error in allowing the prosecutrix to sit in the court room with
her legs bare, whereby her scars remaining from
the injuries she sustained on the night of the alleged attack were continuously visible t·o the jurors. They also urge that it was prejudicial error
to allow the district attorney to exhibit to the jurors the scars on her legs as occular evidence, as
tending to excite pas·sion and prejudice on a matter not in issue. However, there was a definite
relationship between the injuries she received on
the night in question and her lack of consent to
the act of sexual .intercourse. The scars indicated
injuries which evidenced a physical condition of
pain and ;suffering which might have made consent to sexual intercourse highly improbable.
There is no evidence that prosecutrix exposed any
part of her limbs which would not ordinarily be
visible anyway. She was not required to wear
hose. If she had suffered grave facial injuries in
falling from defendant's car, it could not be
urged that she would have had to veil her face
while in the courtroom. The record does not suggest any indecent exposure nor any impropriety
on the part of the prosecutrix in the courtroom.
This assignment of error based on the alleged improper exhibition of the legs of the prosecutrix
without hose, is overruled.''
Defendant evidently loses sight of the fact that
throughout plaintiff's lifetime the ~stump of his arm will
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be continuously exhibited to others. His wife, his mother,
his father, his children, his close friends and n1any others
will become personally and visually acquainted with the
remaining portions of this maimed limb. I do not believe
that they will be shocked by its appearance; neither do
I believe that the jury was shocked in any way or manner which went beyond the rights of the plaintiff in
proving his case to the jury. I suppose counsel would
have been better satisfied if plaintiff had been kept
behind a screen outside the view of the jury during the
progress of the trial, or better ·still if he had made no
appearance whatsoever and his testimony placed before
the jury by deposition. Of course, his injuries, severe
as they were, could not do other than stir a certain
amount of sympathy on the pa~t of any individual, but
this was and is plaintiff's case, a;s are his injuries and
resulting handicaps. However, there is nothing in the
size of the verdict as rendered to indicate that the jury
violated its sworn duty to render ·a true and just verdict according to the law and the evidence.
Counsel for defendant, while not including Instruction No. 11 in his Statement of Errors, saw fit to criticize that instruction on the gr~und that it allowed the
jury to consider five distinct elements of damage in arriving at a verdict. For convenience of the court Instruction No. 11 is set forth herein (R. 63) :
''If YOU find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and· against the defendant it will then become your duty to award him such damages as
you
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dence and under the:se instructions will fairly and
adequately compensate him for any injury and
damage he has sustained as a proximate result of
defendant's negligence complained of by him.
"In determining the amount of such damage,
you may consider the nature and extent of his
injury thus sustained and the amount of suffering, both mental and physical, that he has endured and that he will probably endure in the future and the extent to which he has been vrevented and will be prevented from engaging in the
ordinary and usual affairs of life as theretofore
enjoyed by him and his loss of bodily function
and disfigurement. You may likewise consider his
actual loss of past earnings and any impairment
of earning capacity in the future.
''The total of damages thus assessed for all
of the foregoing must not exceed the sum of $150,000.00, the amount prayed for in plaintiff's complaint.''
The courts recognize that in cases of permanent
disfigurement of a person's body an element of damage
comes into the case which is separate and apart from
the loss of earnings and the general mental and physical suffering resulting from injury. The Court's instruction advised the jury that they eould take into consideration the loss of bodily function and the extent
to which plaintiff had been prevented and would be
prevented from engaging in the ordinary and usual affairs of life, and that they also could take into consideration the disfigurement resulting from the amputation
of his arm. As a matter of fact the court could have
advised the jury more fully with respect to the damSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ages plaintiff could haYe recovered. The jury could have
been advised as to the n1ortification and humiliation to
which plaintiff would be subjected by reason of his disfigurement.
In the case of nluskogee Electric Traction Co. v.
Wimmer, 80 Okla. 11, 194 Pac. 107, 113, 11-±, the following instruction was given by the trial court:
''If you find for the plaintiff, you will allow
him as damages such sum as will compensate
him for the injuries he has sustained, not exceeding $10,000, which is the amount sued for. The
elements entering into the damages, are as f·ollows:
"(1) The value of his time during the period he was disabled by the injury.

"(2) If the injuries have impaired Wimmer's power to earn money in the future, such
sum as will compensate him for such loss of
power.
'' ( 3) Such reasonable sum as the jury shall
award him on account of any pain and anguish
he had suffered by reason of his injuries.
'' (4) Such prospective suffering and 1oss of
health, if any, as the jury may believe reasonably
·certain to result therefrom, from all the evidence
before them in the case, and that he will sustain
by reason 'Of his injuries.
'' ( 5) Such sum as the jury deem ~roper for
the inconvenience of going through life with one
eye and ~such mortification and anguish as Wimmer has suffered and will continue to suffer by
reas~on of the mutilation of his face, and .the fact
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that he may become an object of curiosity and
ridicule among his fellows.''
Of this instruction the Court stated:
''In the case of Ferguson & Wheeler Land,
Lumber & Handle Go. v. Good, supra, in which
the jury was allowed to take into consideration
the disfigurement of the plaintiff, caused by the
l,oss of his eye, in arriving at the damages, the
court held:
"'The humiliation and mental anguish that
must necessarily be experienced by the personal
disfigurement resulting from the los's of an eye
is a proper element for the consideration of the
jury.'
"In Coombs v. King, 107 Me. 376, 78 Atl. 468,
Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1121, the court approved an instruction permitting the jury to find for the plaintiff for humiliati,on and mortification, by virtue
of disfigurement, saying:
'' 'There is good reason for the rule. The disfigurement is a physical inj-q.ry. It is a continuing injury. The mental suffering may continue
with it. The mental ,suffering is a real injury. It
proceeds necessarily and inevitably from the physical injury. It is a natural consequence of the
injury. Compensation, omitting this element, is
not full compensation. One might be made repulsive to the sight for life with comparatively
little physical injury, and yet, according ,to the
rule contended for, be entitled to but little compensation.'
"In Amanta v. Michigan C. R. Co., 177 :Mich.
280, 143 N. "\V. 76, where the injury complained
of was the loss of a leg or arm, the court approved
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an instruction allowing the jury to consider huIniliation for such condition, and holding that the
physical condition of the plaintiff was a complete answer to the contention that there was no
evidence of humiliation and of future suffering,
although it appeared that the wound had completely healed.
''In Shortridge v. Scarritt Est. Co., 145 Mo.
App. 295, 130 S. ,V. 126, the injury complained
of resulted in disfigurement to the face, and the
court sustained a verdict for mental suffering
aris_ing from contemplation of the disfigurement,
sayrng:
'' 'The distinction sought to be made, in the
cases to which we have referred, between mental
pain caused by physical pain and mental pain
produced by the bitter knowledge that the victim
would be maimed or disfigured for life, is more
refined and subtle than it is practical or humane. How can it be said that one is more remote
and intangible than the other~ Both are real, substantial, natural consequences of the injury tha;t
caused the disfigurement. It is just as certain that
the injured person will be oppressed by a sense of
humiliation and mortification over the despoiling
of his body as it is that he will suffer mental anguish as :a result of his physical pain. The jury
can understand the nature and extent of the one
as well as the other, and estimate the com~ensa
tion of each with equal exactness. To deprive
plaintiff of this element ·of his damages would
be violative of the fundamental rule that gives
to the plaintiff, injured by the negligence of the
defendant, full and fair compensation for the actual damages suffered.'
''The Supreme Court of North Carolina in
Britt v. Car. No. R. Co., 148 N. C. 37, 61 S. E.
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601, sustained the admission of a statement by the
to the effect that it almost broke his
hea:rt to know that he would be a cripple for life,
saying:
pl~aintiff

'' 'This, however, is a part of the suffering
like the physical suffering, the decreased earning
capacity, the cost of nursing and medical attention, which are a part of the 'present and pros'pective loss' resulting from the injury, and the
immediate and necessary consequences thereof.'
"In the case of United States Exp. Co. v.
Wahl, 94 C. C. A. 260, 168 Fed. 848, the court
held that it was proper to consider the humiliation resulting from the disfigurement from the
loss of an eye, and considered the law settled in
this respect, by virtue of the case of McDermott
v. Severe, 202 U. S. 600, 26 Sup. Ct. 709, 50 L.
Ed. 1162.
''The cases quoted above are the recent expressions upon this question that we have been
able to obtain. However, such principle has been
the established rule throughout most of the states
for a long period of years."
In the case of Wilson v. Kurn, (Mo.) 183 S. W.
(2d) 553 (1944), the plaintiff received injuries in a
crossing accident which resulted in the amputation of
his arm. A verdict for plaintiff was affirmed. An instruction on the measure of damages advised the jury
that they could consider plaintiff's age and ex'pectancy,
his diminished earning capacity, and "you will also take
into consideration any physical disfigurement which
plaintiff has sustained,'' and any physical pain or mental anguish, loss of wages and medical expenses. The deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fendant contended that this "\Yas error because it authorized compensation for disfigurement in addition to damages for mental anguish and diminution of earnings and
thereby authorized ''double damages.'' The Court held
that the instruction was proper and in doing so, ·stated:
''Furthermore, as the appellant says, disfigurement in ·and of itself is not necessarily an
element of damage except for its effect upon the
mind and is therefore compensable as mental
anguish. Shortridge v. Scarrit Estate Co., 145
~Io. App. 295, 130 'S. W. 126. For this reason
damages for mental anguish may, be recovered
under a plea of physical disfigurement. Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac Co., 339 Mo. 711, 98 S. W.
(2d) 969. And by the same reasoning the anguish
of physical disfigurement should be compensable
under a plea of mental anguish alone.
''The mental angui·sh of physical disfigurement differs in degree ·and i:s not identical vvith
the mental pain accompanying serious personal
injury in general and so considered the two are
not 'double damages' in the sense Df an allowance
of double compensation for the smne loss. 49 Har.
L. R. 1033. But even so we cannot see that the
instruction differs in principle from Baker v.
Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 327 M·o. 986, 39 S. W. 2d
535, 545, which ·permitted the jury to consider
'pain of body and anguish of mind,' loss of earnings and 'any crippling, apart from pain of body
and anguish of mind and apart from loss of earnings * * * which the evidence ~shows he has sustained or will be reasonably certain to sustain in
the future.' See, also, Banks v. Morris & Co., 302
Mo. 254, 257 S. W. 482. ''
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In Baker v. Chicago B .. & Q. R. Co., (Mo.) 39 S. W.
(2d) 535, a contention was made similar to that made in
the case at bar by the defendant. The Baker case was
also a Federal Employers' Liability Act case. Plaintiff
brought suit for personal injuries. The injuries resulted
in a gradual decalcification of the bones of the right foot
and his inability to use the foot resulted in atrophy of
the muscles. The testimony indicated that this condition would become progressively worse. At page 545 of
39 S. W. (2d) is set out at length the instruction given
to the jury relating to the measure of damages. In that
instruction the jury was told they could consider any
pain of body and anguish of mind which the evidence
showed the plaintiff had suffered or would suffer in the
future, any loss of ear~ings which he had sustained or
was reasonably certain to sustain in the future and ''for
any crippling, apart fr?m pain ·of body and anguish of
mind, and apart from loss of earnings, which the evidence shows he has sustained or will be reasonably certain to sustain in the future.'' The jury was further
instructed that they could take into consideration the
character and nature of plaintiff's injury, whether permanent or not, and to assess his damages at such sum
as would be fair and re!asonable compensation for his
injuries.
Defendant criticized this instruction up o ~ the
grounds that it permitted the recovery of double damSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ages. Defendant contended that "crippling" is not a
separate and independent element of damages which are
properly recoverable by plaintiff and that is included
within the elements of bodily 1lain, mental anguish and
loss of earnings, which elements were also set out in the
instruction.
The court held that this instruction properly set
forth the elements of damages. and that there was no
duplication of recovery permitted by said instruction.
In Purdy v. Swift & Co., 34 Cal. App. (2d) 656, 94

Pac. (2d) 389 (1939), the Court, in considering a contention that the verdict was excessive, stated:

" ' * * * in addition to the loss of earning
capacity the jury were 'entitled to consider the
inconvenience and annoyance of the permanent
loss of the sense of smell,1 impairment of the sense
of taste, loss of memory ~nd mental alertness and
the other mental and personality changes above
enumerated, together with the pain and suffering
immediately following the injury, much of which
persisted to the time of trial.''
In Prettyman v. Topkis, 3 Atl. (2d) 708 (1938), the
Court stated as follows:
"In addition to pain and suffering, both past
and future, the jury could properly take into consider!ation in arriving at its verdict the loss to
the plaintiff occasioned by his permanent injuries,
not only the impairment of earning ability, but
also the inconvenience which would follow in his
other relations of life.''
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In Conroy v. Reid, 132 Me. 162, 168 Atl. 215, the
Court stated:

"* * * She (plaintiff) is entitled to recover
for the pain and suffering which resulted from
her injuries. The scar upon her head is a physical disfigurement which along with the mental
chagrin, mortification - - discomfort she endures
now and in the future as a direct and natural
consequence of it, is an element of damage for
which she is entitled to recover."
Counsel, in his oral argument, made reference to
Bruner v. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 Pac. (2d) 649,
and claimed that this case was authority for the Court
t'O hold ~the present instruction erroneous. Of course, in
the first place the verdict in the Bruner case was upheld
and the court held that the instruction there involved was
not prejudicial error. In that case the instruction set
forth that the jury could take into consideration in
assessing damages the loss of wages and future earnings,
also the impairment of earning capacity, and also the
loss of power and capacity to work and its effect upon
his future. However, the court said that this did not
constitute prejudicial error. In the case at bar we ~submit
that the instruction is not subject to the same criticism
as the instruction in the Bruner case; but, even so, it
does not permit the extent of recovery which was there
allowed. It is common sense that if a person loses his
arm, he has lost something besides the mere capacity
to work. The body is disfigured. He will suffer mortification and humiliation from his disfigurement. There
is an actual loss of bodily function which will prevent
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him from doing the ordinary things thai he otherwise
could do. For instance, tying a tie, or his shoe laces.
His capacity to drive an automobile will be interfered
with. Those matters certainly under the authorities are
elements for which defendant by reason of its negligence
must compensate.
1\Te submit that the instruction given properly presented this element of damage to the jury as indicated
not only by common sense but by the authorities heretofore cited.

Plaintiff respectfully submits that the damages
awarded were not only well within the 1>roof on this element, but as matter of fact were moderate indeed, and
that a verdict for the loss of his right arm in the amount
of $70,000, including all other matters of damage, cannot be interfered with under the principles of law heretofore announced by this Court and supported by the
wealth of authority herein cited.
POINT III.
EXHIBITS "G" AND "H" WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED
IN EVIDENCE AND THE FOUNDATIONAL BASIS. FOR
SAID EXHIBITS WAS AMPLE AND SUFFICIENT UNDER
THE AUTHORITIES

The real purpose of defendant's attack upon Exhibits "G" and "H" is disclosed in its brief commenCing at page 21. It apparently desires this Court to
overrule the following cases recently decided: Bruner
v. McOarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 Pac. (2d) 649·; Allison
v. McCarthy, et ~al, 106 Utah 278, 147 Pac. (2d) 870;
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Pauly v. McCarthy, et ~al., 106 Utah 431, 184 Pac. (2d)
123; SchlaUer v. Mc0a~t1lvy, 196 Pac. (2d) 968.
This contention of defendant is contrary to the law
as set forth by the Tenth Circuit Court in Southern Pacific Corrt1pi(J;wy v. J(l!inge, 65 Fed. (2d) 85 (1933). That
court in approvi:ng the use of tables similar to these
exhibits stated:
''The trial court, concisely but clearly, told
the jury to ascertain the impairment of Plaintiff's
earning power resulting from his injury; determine his expectancy; and arrive at a verdict which
would reflect the present worth of that impairment. With annuity tables in evidence, the court's
charge, rendered the jury's task a comparatively
simple one.''
Defendant states that these Exhibits ''should be
barred in the courts of this jurisdiction, on the general
ground of their immateriality and incompetency.''
These tables are merely mathen1atical computations made under the direction of a Certified Public
Accountant disclosing the present lump sum value of
various monthly payments over a period of the life
expectancy of a person the same age as the plaintiff irt
this case.
We are at a loss to know where a jury of lay persons could ever obtain the facts regarding life expectancy of an individual if this information were not furnished and produced by some qualified person. This
information, of necessity, comes from mortality tables.
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Two tables were used in the case at bar, one known
as the ...-\.merican Experience Table of Mortality which
has been in general use by insurance companies since
its publication in 1868. The other was a more recent
table compiled by the Census Bureau of the U. S.
Department of Commerce and published in 1941.
From the life expectancy of the individual further
computations are made in these exhibits to determine
the present value of various sums representing monthly
income. Under the law, the jury is required to discount any sums awarded for loss of future earnings.
The law is accurately stated by the Court in its Instruction No. 12 (R. 64). By that instruction the jury was
advised that plaintiff would not be entitled to recover
in a lump sum the total accumulations of such loss of
earnings over the entire period of his disability; that
the award for such element of damages must be reduced or discounted on the basis of a fair rate of interest or return on such sum.
Expert testimony was introduced by the witness
:Myrick concerning the rate of interest or return which
could be fairly expected from a safe investment which
a person of ordinary prudence, but without any particular financial experience or skill, could make. It
would be idle to assume that eight lay jurors could
accurately discount the award allowed for loss of future earnings. The tables introduced as Exhibits "G"
and '' H'' formed a necessary part of the case to be
submitted to the jury. We know of no way that a jury
could be advised of the only accurate method of perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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forming these calculations except through the testimony
of an expert who appears in court and under oath states
that the calculations he has made of the discounts as a
qualified expert are mathematically accurate. May we
remind the Court that a high verdict is not necessarily
an unjust verdict. Experience teaches that pathetically
low verdicts are many times unjust. No defendant can
rightfully complain of a verdict based on an accurate
mathematically accurate formula.
We submit that the jury should not be left to
figure these matters by themselves without the assistance of available expert assistance. The introduction
of these exhibits is necessary. If the witness merely
testified to all of these figures and they were not preserved in written form, it would be impossible for the
jury to remember the calculations and figures or to
make any sensible use of them in their deliberations.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the Exhibits are admissible, and we refer the Court ~gain
to the language used in the Utah cases herein cited
where the purposes and materiality of the exhibits are
discussed.
The balance of defendant's argument regarding
the exhibits has no merit and is apparently made in
the hope that it will bolster the real purpose of the
defendant. It is to be noted defendant does not now
and has never questioned the accuracy of the mortality
tables nor the accuracy of the computations made under
the direction of Mr. Wood.
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During the course of the trial and at the tin1e
the exhibits were offered in evidence, the Judge stated
to defendant's counsel:
'·'yell, if you doubt the accuracy of the
books or the data, perhaps you could-you would
have an opportunity to present any evidence you
care to with respect to it" (R. 267, 268).
X o effort was made by the defendant at any time
during the trial to show any inaccuracy in the computations contained in the exhibits. This case comes
to this Court with the mathematical accuracy of the
exhibits unchallenged. An expert accountant, under
oath, testified that the exhibits were mathematically accurate. That testimony has never been challenged or
contradicted on the record or otherwise.
The motion for new trial was filed :May 29th, 1948,
argued June 26th and July 3rd, and finally denied September 27th, 1948. Defendant did not then and it has
not yet challenged the accuracy of the computations or
formulas used. Defendant's counsel merely sits back
and says:
"I can't be sure the computations are accurate. The expert on figures has used the standard books in his profession, but as a lawyer, I
don't know about those books. I want something
more.''
vVhat more was there to introduce in evidence
as foundation for the admission of the

exhibits~

The
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formulas were taken from standard books generally
used in the accounting profession to eliminate the necessity of long drawn out calculations. Mr. Wood explained it would take perhaps a month to accomplish
the necessary calculations shown by the exhibits. If
the calculations could be made with two or three strokes
of the pen there would be no necessity for books showing the result of such computations. The tables are
merely 1nathematical calculations made to aid the jury
in arriving at a determination of the amount of money
which should he allowed for loss of future earnings.
Appellant's very argument supports plaintiff's contention that these mathematical facts and computations, which must be used by the jury in determining
present value of a discounted future diminution of
earning capacity, can only be made available to a jury
by mathematically correct tables prepared by qualified
experts. As testified by ~1:r. Wood, the first item related
to the sum of $1.00, and in order for an individual to receive 457 monthly payments of $1.00 each, where the
interest rate or return was 2.%% per annum, it would
be necessary to deposit now $283.07. We submit that no
jury of laymen could make that calculation without expert assistance. The Court could no doubt if it so desired, sit down and determine the mathematical accuracy of that computation. Mr. Wood thought it would
take about 30 days to make all necessary calculations.
Counsel for plaintiff has not undertaken to test
the figures in this manner principally because counsel
for plaintiff produced an expert accountant who testified, under oath, that this would be the result reached.
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Until it appears that this is not so, it would seem that
to go through the long computations indicated, the trial
court and this court are justified in accepting the word
of Mr. 'Yood. Plaintiff's witness testified under oath
concerning the accuracy of his calculations, identified
the source of his information, defendant desires the
court to do what it has never done, refuse the exhibit
on a theory of imagined inaccuracy.
Ray G. "Tood, a Certified Public Accountant, was
a competent witness regarding all matters pertaining
to figures and mathematical calculations. He is a partner in a firm of Certified Public Accountants duly licensed in the State of Utah and having practiced his
profession for a period of 25 years. He was called to
testify regarding the mathematical computations appearing in Exhibits "G" and "H". These computations were made under his direction and checked by
him. :i\fr. Wood has used mathematical formulas in
making calculations similar to those contained in the
Exhibits for many years. He has prepared Exhibits
similar to the Exhibits in this case many times before
and has testified on similar matters as an expert in
many other cases (R. 275). His statement that the
publications used by him and exhibited to the Court
and jury, were also used by Banks was never challenged.
Exhibits "G" and "H" are mathematically accurate.
I

The life expectancy of 38.12 years in Exhibit "G"
based on the American Experience Table of Mortality
and the life expectancy of 42.38 years in Exhibit '' H''
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based on the United States Life Tables are computations which can be readily checked at any time by court
and counsel. He testified, under oath, that the computations on both Exhibits were mathematically correct (R.
238, 244), and that the computations on the Exhibits
were made by use of certain formulas appearing in a
standard text ( R .. 249). He had personally checked and
worked the formulas in the text and determined them
to be accurate (R.. 250). The text containing the formulas was a book entitled "Financial Compound Interest
and Annuity Tables", published by the Financial Publishing Company. It was used by at least one trust
company in Salt Lake City. Mr. Wood had checked
the tables in the book with tables in other books used
by his profession and in particular a book entitled
"Mathematics of Finance" by McKenzie, published by
McGraw Hill Book Company. The mathematical formulas in the two books were identical (R. 257). He also
checked the formulas against those contained in the
Accountants' Handbook, a publication used by the
American Institute of Accountants and used generally
in the accounting profession, and the formulas were
found to be identical (R. 260). He testified that he
could figure out the tables in their entirety without
the use of the formula but that it would take him a long
time to do so ( R. 2'66).
The court offered to allow counsel for the defendant the privilege and opportunity to check and test
the accuracy of the formula used by Mr. Wood and to
offer any evidence in that regard which he wished beSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fore the Exhibits were admitted in evidence (R. 269).
Of course, the court's offer was never accepted and defendant neYer made any offer of proof whatsoever
controyerting or questioning the accuracy of the figures
appearing on the Exhibits and defendant does not now
contend that these mathematical con1putations are erroneous. Counsel now advances the proposition that
the formulas used in the computations were taken from
books that were not standard; were not properly authenticated, and that no proper foundation was laid for
the use of the formulas. These contentions are unsupported by the record. Counsel entirely overlooks the
testimony of ~Ir. Wood that he had personally checked
the formulas by working some of them and had also compared them with those set forth in other publications and
had found them to be accurate. He stated that he had
personally checked the figures in the Exhibits and determined them to be accurate. Counsel for the defendant has had adequate and sufficient time in which to
satisfy himself regarding the accuracy of the figures.
The motion for a new trial was held under advisement for six months. Additional time has elapsed since
appeal was taken from the order of the court denying
defendant's motion. At no time has counsel contested
the mathematical accuracy of the Exhibits and they
must, therefore, be assumed to be accurate. The court
or the jury having been given the facts upon which the
calculations were based, if given sufficient time
and if sufficiently versed in mathematics, could no
doubt have made the calculations. Mr. Wood made the
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calculations as an expert in the interest of conserving
thne on the part of the court and jury.
Counsel for defendant has failed to advance any
reason why either the American Experience Tables or
the United States Life Tables, used in determining life
expectancy, are not matters of which the court could
take judicial notice, or that Mr. Wood was not a perfectly competent expert in the use of figures or calculations, or that the calculations themselves were not mathematically accurate. Under the authorities cited herein
the Exhibits were properly received in evidence.
The defendant has questioned the use of the mortality tables. He has stated that the tables themselves
should have been introduced in evidence. We are unable
to understand this language. Does counsel mean that
plaintiff should have offered Volume VI of the Utah
Code in evidence before Mr. Wood could testify regarding the American Experience Tables of Mortality~ Examination of Volume VI of the Utah Code discloses that
under the American Experience Tables the life expectancy of a person 26 years of age is 38.12 years. Remarkably, Mr. Wood testified that the American Experience Table indicated that a man, 26 years of age,
would have a life expectancy of 38.12 years, or 457
months. There being 12 months in a year, 12 x 38.12
gives the result of 457.44 months. What other or different testimony would there have been before the jury
had the Statutes been given to them~
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It has been held in many cases that the Court can
take judicial notice of the American Experience Tables
of Mortality which were compiled in the year 1860.
Southern Pac. Co. r. De r alle Da Costa (Oct. 4, 1911),
190 F. 689, 698; Heath v. Stephens et ux (Wash. July
28, 1927), 258 Pac. 321, 322; Roalsen v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., C\Yash. )lay 14, 1928), 267 Pac. 433, 435;
Whetstine r. Atchis~on, T. & 8. F. Ry. Co., (Kan. Jan.
30, 1932), 7 Pac. (2d) 501, 505; JI cf..Tair v. Berger, (}font.
Oct. 26, 1932) 15 Pac. (2d) 834, 838; Ewens v. New1nan
et al (Cal. ~Iay -!, 1933) 21 Pac. (2d) 1007; Cox v. Polson Logging Co., (\Vash. ~Iay 17, 1943) 138 Pac. (2d)
169, 176.
In Southern Pac. Co. v. De Valle Da Costa, supra,

the Court stated:
''It is urged also that the court erred in permitting the use of mortality tables without requiring any evidence that the tables were authentic or in general use; but this is a matter of judicial notice, and there is no error in this respect.
Chamberlayne's Modern Law of Evidence, S.oo.
859 C."
In Heath v. Stephens et ux, supra, the court stated:

'' * * * According to the weight of authority
the courts will take judicial notice of the standard tables of mortality. Jones on Evidence, Sec.
129; 19 R.C.L. 221. And therefore appellants
might have had the jury instructed definitely as to
. the life expectancy of the deceased, had a request therefor been made. Failing such an instruc-
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tion, we cannot say that men and women of whom
our juries are composed have not had the average and ordinary experiences of life and are not
in a position to know that a man of 62, hale,
strong, and hearty, has the expectancy of a number of years of usefulness before him, but that
in the course of nature and human affairs his
earning power, if dependent upon physical
strength and dexterity, is likely from that age
on to decrease steadily and to end in a comparatively few years. In any event, mortality tables
are based on averages, and had the jury been instructed as to what such tables proved, they still
might have found that this man was above the
average in strength and vitality.''
In Roalsen v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., supra, the
court stated :
''The court instructed the jury as to Andresen's expectancy of life without the introduction
in evidence of a mortality table, and error is
urged because it did so. It may be doubted, ·we
think, whether this question is open to the appellant, but, conceding it to be so open, we find no
error in the court's action. The court takes judicial notice of the standard mortality tables ( Suell
v. Jones, 49 Wash. 582, 96 P. 4), and the court
can properly inform the jury as to the expectancy
of life of a given person, where the matter is
pertinent to the inquiry before it, without taking
evidence on the matter. The case cited also
answers another objection the appellant makes in
this connection, namely, that it was not shown
that Andresen came within the class of risks to
which such tables are applicable. But as we said
in the cited case, whenever it becomes necessary
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to estin1ate the value of annuities, dower, curtesy,
or damages for wrongful act, such tables may
properly be considered. It is true that the effect
of such tables as evidence is for the trier of the
facts, and true also that such triers, in determining the life expectancy of any person, may take
into consideration his vocation, occupation, and
condition of health, both mentally and bodily, and
may find that these considerations destroy the
value of the tables as evidence, but these considerations only go to the weight of the tables as evidence; they are not inadmissible for such reason.''
In Cox v. Polson Logging Co., supra, the Court
stated:
"It is the law in this state that the court
takes judicial notice of standard mortality tables
and, where the matter is pertinent to the inquiry
before it, may properly inform the jury as to the
expectancy of life of the person concerned, without taking evidence on the subject. Roalsen v.
Oregon Stevedoring Co., 147 Wash. 672, 267 P.
433. ''

The trial court, when the witness Wood informed
him of the contents of the two life tables, was satisfied to
accept his word upon the authenticity of these tables and
the information given. There is no proof nor evidence
that the information given was erroneous or that the
tables were not authentic. The trial court being satisfied, no error was committed.
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In the case of J( east v. Santa Ysabel Gold J.lfin. Co.,
136 Cal. 256, 68 Pac. 771, the, court stated:
''There was no error of the court in admitting in evidence McCarty's Statistician & Economist, containing FaiT's table of expectancy of
life, to show the probable duration of the life of
the deceased. It is not questioned that proper
evidence of such expectancy of life was admissible. In some courts it is said that such tables
are admissible after proper preliminary proof of
their authenticity and standard quality. Such
proof in this case was not made, but the general
weight of authority is to the contrary, and permits the introduction of such tables as are satisfactory to the court. The court may or may not
require such preliminary proof, depending upon
whether of its own knowledge it is satisfied, or
whether it desires evidence to satisfy itself of
the authenticity of the tables. Thus in Gallagher
v. Market Street Co., 67 Cal. 13, 6 Pac. 869, 51
Am. Rep. 680, note, it is said: 'Thus, mortuary
(sic.) tables for estimating the probable duration
of life of a party at a given age * * * are admissible to prove f~cts of general notoriety and interest in connection with such subjects as may be
involved in the trial of the cause.'
The defendant also objects to the use of the U. S.
Life Tables published by the Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Census, Washington, D. C.. , on January 11,
1945, which is found in Volume 19, No. 4, Page 31, Vital
Statistics, Special Reports. This table also appears in
the World Almanac for 1945 at page 502. This identical table was used in determining the life expectancy of
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plaintiff in the case of Foerster u. Direito, (Cal. July 12,
1946) 170 Pac. (2d) 986. The court therein stated, p. 992:
":it: * :it: It was stipulated that plaintiff was
58 years of age at the time of the accident, and
that the American Table of Mortality allotted
to her a life expectancy of 15.39 years. Without
actual proof thereof courts take judicial notice
of Mortality Tables. Wong Kit v. Crescent
Creamery Co., supra, 87 Cal. App. at page 581,
262 P. 481; Peluso v. City Taxi Co., Supra, 41
Cal. App. at page 302, 182 P. 808; 31 C.J.S.,
Evidence, Sec. 99, p. 698. The World Almanac
for 1945, page 502, shows that the life expectancy of a white female, who is 58 years of age, is
18.46 years according to the United States Bureau
of the Census. It is common knowledge that the
life expectancy of human beings has rapidly increased in recent years on account of modern
methods of living, the advanced knowledge of
medicine and surgery, and of sanitary conditions.
The purchasing value o{ money has also greatly
3
.
decreased.' '

Here, again, there would be no necessity for the
introduction in evidence of the~ table itself as only one
computation therein was of any importance, the life
expectancy of a white male, age 26 years, whose indicated expectancy is 42.38 years, or 508.56 months. To
introduce the entire table would not have been helpful.
Mr. Wood had obtained his copy of the table some few
years before the trial of the case, and these tables can
be obtained from the Department of Commerce by anyone desirous of procuring them.
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Counsel for defendant during the trial of the case
was not interested in seeing Mr. Wood's copy of the
table. He now says the table itself should have been introduced in evidence.
We submit there is no merit to his contention and we
are satisfied that Mr. Wood truthfully testified to the
life expectancy set forth in this table which has been
recognized in at least one case from the State of California. See Foerslier v. Direito, supra. We cite the Court
to City of Twin Falls ex .rel Cannon v. K<oehler et al
(Idaho) 123 Pac. (2d) 714, and Jones v. Freeman Speak·er of the House of Repr.e:sent.atives et al, (Okla.) 146 Pac.
(2d) 564, where judicial notice was taken of facts and
circumstances concerning the Federal Census.
It appears from the authorities cited and text statements mentioned therein that courts have traditionally
taken judicial notice of mortality tables, census reports
and information contained in standard publications. Especially is that true in the field of undertermined fact.
Life expectancy presents a problem which has never
been mathematically determined. Neither the Court, the
jury nor any individual can forecast the days of future
life of any person; yet the jury is required to ''forecast
the days'' whenever it is called upon to determine future
earnings or future diminution of earning capacity. As
indicated in Volume VI of our Code, there exists many
. different mortality tables, all based on different experiences and different studies. The jury may or may not
consider these tables as the trial court instructed the
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jury in the case at bar. "\Yhether the jury paid any attention ·whatsoever to exhibits ·' G'' and '' H'' does not
appear from its verdict, and there is nothing in the verdict to either indicate that they did or did not study the
tables or give them any weight whatsoever in arriving
at their verdict in this case. But, be that as it may, the
jury was supplied with proper information on this subject. If no tables whatsoever had been called to their
attention, the Court in determining whether or not the
verdict was adequate or excessive could take judicial notice of these tables for the very purpose of resolving
that question.
Defendant rn its attack upon these exhibits complains that there was no instruction given to the jury
limiting or qualifying the use to be made of the information contained in the U. S. Life Table. It is to be observed that defendant made no request limiting or qualifying the use to be made of these tables. Before defendant can successfully claim error for such failure request must be made for such instructions. McAfee v.
Ogden R. & D. Co., 62 Utah 115, 218 P. 98 (1923); T.aylor v. Los Angeles & 8. L. R. Co., 61 Utah 524, 216 P.
239 (1923) ; Ward v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 9'6 Utah
·564, 85 P.(2d) 837 (1939).
In the McAfee case the Court stated:
"It is a well settled rule in this jurisdiction
that partial non instruction or omission to charge
as to a particular issue does not constitute reversible error in the absence of a specific request
for a more specific comprehensive instruction.
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Such also is the rule in the federal courts. Backus
v. Fort, St. U. D. Co., 169 U. S. 557, 18 Sup. Ct.
445, 42 L. Ed. 853 and cases cited."
The U. S. Supreme Court has also recognized the
foregoing rule in cases under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. Lovuisville & N~ashville R. Oo. v. H ollowwy,
246 U. S. 525, 62 L. Ed. 867, 38 Sup. Ct. 379 (1917);
Western & AtZantic R. Oo. v. Hughes, 278 U. S. 496, 73
L. Ed. 473 (1928).
There are numerous cases holding that if a defendant desires an instruction limiting the force and effect
to be given mortality or annuity tables, or an instruction
as to the manner in which such tables are to be applied,
then he should request such an instruction and upon his
failure to so request, then he is in no position to complain
and no error has been committed. Murray v. Omaha
Transfer Co., 95 Neb. 175, 145 N. W. 360 (1914); St'earns
Coal ~and Lumber Co. v. Calhoun, 166 Ky. 607, 179 S.
W. 590 (1915); Peterrs v. Kans:as City Ry. Co., 204 Mo.
App. 197, 224 8. W. 25 (1920); City :of Key West v.
Baldwin, 69 Fla. 136, 67 So. 808 (1915) ; Cubbage v. Estate of Youngerman, 15·5 Iowa 39, 134 N. W. 1074; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co; v. Johnson, 71 Okl. 118, 175 P.
494 (1918); Mut1p1hy v. National Ice Cream Co., 114 Cal.
App. 482,300 Pac. 91 (1931); Rooney v. New York, N.H.
& H. R. Co., 173 Mass. 222, 53 N. E. 435 (1899); Friend v.
Ingersoll, 39 Neb. 717, 58 N·. W. 281 (1894).
Defendant did not except to Instruction No. 13 (R.
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fendant can not complain that further instructions were
not given on this subject. The trial court should have
been advised by defendant if it was not satisfied with
the manner in which these exhibits were submitted to
the jury.
The only authority which defendant cites criticizing the use of such Exhibits as "G" and "H", is the
case of JI cCaffrey v. Szcartz, 285 Pa. 561, 132 Atl. 810.
This case is one from the State of Pennsylvania which
jurisdiction stands alone in its critical attitude toward
exhibits such as these. A reading of the case cited reveals
that the Penns:-lvania Court conceded that it stands
alone in this respect.
We submit that defendant's whole contention on
this subject is without merit or substance and that it does
not deserve the passing tribute of judicial notice.
A8SIGN~1ENT

OF ERRORS ON PLAINTIFF'S
CROSS-APPEAL

I.
The Trial court committed reversible error in its
Instruction No. 8, which was as follows (R. 60) :
''If you believe from a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff lost his balance and
fell from the moving car solely as a result of his
own failure to exercise reasonable care to maintain his footing and balance on the car, then your
verdict must be in favor of the defendant, 'no
cause of action.' "
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to which plaintiff made the following exception (R..... ) :
''Plaintiff excepts to Instruction No. 8 and
each and every portion thereof on the ground
and for the reason that there is no evidence whatsoever of plaintiff's contributory negligence."

II.
The court committed reversible error in its Instruction No.9, which was as follows (R. 61):
"The plaintiff was under a duty at all times
to exercise such reasonable care for his own safety
in maintaining his balance and footing on the
moving car and in performing his duties as a
brakeman, as would and should have been exercised by an ordinary prudent person of similar
age, intelligence, and experience under the same
circumstances. And, if, at the time and place in
question, he failed to thus exercise that degree of
care that an ordinary reasonable, prudent person
would have done under the same circumstances,
that would he negligence on his part; and, if you
find from a preponderance of the evidence that
the plaintiff was negligent as above set forth,
which proximately caused or contributed to cause
his injury, then you 'should take that into
account in connection with any verdict rendered
in this ease, as set forth in Instruction No. 10. ''
to which plaintiff made the following exception (R ..... ):
''Instruction No. 9 and each and every sentence and part thereof upon the ground and for
the reason, there was no evidence introduced
which proved or tended to prove that plaintiff
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was negligent in any way, or that he failed to
exercise reasonable and proper care for his own
safety."
III.
The court committed reversible error in its Instruction No. 10, which was as follows (R. 62):
''If ~-ou find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is liable to plaintiff in
this case, it will be your duty to determine
whether or not you believe from a preponderance
of the evidence that plaintiff was also guilty of
negligence ·which proximately contributed to the
happening of the injury. If you find that he was
thus negligent, I say to you as a matter of law
that you must determine the proportion in which
the negligence of the defendant and of plaintiff,
respectively, contributed to the happening of the
injury, and diminish the amount of his damage in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the plaintiff.
"In order to make clear to you what is meant
by this comparison of negligence which under
the Federal law, the jury may make, I shall give
you the following illustrations:
"If the plaintiff's negligence contributed to
or caused, we will say, the injury to the extent of
one-third of the entire negligence, then the plaintiff's damages would be reduced by one-third; if
to the extent of one-half, then his damages would
be reduced by one-half; if to the extent of twothirds, then his damages would be reduced by twothirds; and if the plaintiff's negligence was alone
the
cause of the injury, then of course that would
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wipe out the damages, and your verdict would be
in favor of the defendant."
to which plaintiff made the following exception (R. ____ ):
"Plaintiff excepts to Instruction No. 10 and
each and every portion thereof, upon the ground
and for the reason (a) there was no evidence of
plaintiff's contributory negligence; (b) the instruction is confusing and contains an invitation
to the jury to diminish damages without proof
of contributory negligence."

IV.
The jury erred in reducing the verdict from $70,000.00 to $50,000.00 on account of contributory negligence, as hereinabove set forth.
CROSS-APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT
I.
THERE WAS NO PROOF OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF
IN THIS CASE.
In its answer defendant alleged contributory negligence in general terms (R. 14):
''Further answering said complaint, defendant alleges that if the plaintiff sustained an accident and injury as alleged, his own failure to
exercise reasonable care to avoid such accident
and injury contributed thereto and was a proximate cause thereof.''
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At no time in the course of the trial did defendant
prove, or attempt to prove, that the plaintiff was negligent in the performance of his duties.
The court, in Instruction No. 8, gave in substance
defendant's requested Instruction No. 8 in the following
words. (R. 60) :
'• If you believe from a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff lost his balance and
fell from the moving car solely as a result of his
own failure to exercise reasonable care to maintain his footing and balance on the car, then your
verdict must be in favor of the defendant, 'no
cause of action'.''
to which plaintiff duly excepted.

,_

_.

Defendant did not prove, or offer to prove, that
plaintiff lost his balance and fell from the moving car
as a result of his failure to maintain his footing and
balance on the car. The only evidence on the subject was
plaintiff's own testimony. He never at any time departed
from his statement that the sole and only reason for
his fall and injury was the sudden, unexpected and unusual jerk of the train. The jury necessarily found that
there was a sudden, unusual and unexpected jerk which
dislodged and threw plaintiff from his position on top
of the car. The jury's finding in that regard was amply
supported. The jury, however, due to the court's error
as herein maintained, went further and found plaintiff
guilty of contributory negligence. The only contention
ever made by defendant regarding the details of plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence was that plaintiff
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was injured ''as a result of his own failure to exercise
reasonable care to maintain his footing and balance on
the car." The only evidence regarding plaintiff's position on the car and his activity while on the car was his
own evidence and defendant and jury alike were therefore bound by it. He never breathed one word which
could have warranted the jury in finding that he was
negligent nor was there a single scintilla of evidence
which warranted the submission of this issue to the jury.
His testimony stands uncontroverted and unquestioned
to the effect that the sole and only cause of his falling
was the sudden, unusual and unexpected jerk. We, therefore, respectfully submit that the submission of the issue
of contributory negligence to the jury and the mitigation of damages in the amount of $20,000.00 for contributory negligence was prejudicial error and therefore
the verdict should be reinstated in its entirety.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the authorities
support his contentions made on cross-appeal.

DeZano v. Roberts, 182 S. W. 771 (Mo. 1916).
This action was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The plaintiff, a fireman on an engine, was injured by being jarred from the tender to the
floor of the engine while it was being coupled to the
train. The fireman climbed up on the tender and opened
the chute, allowing coal to flow down in to fill the tender.
When it was full, he closed the chute, raked back the
coal from the front edge to prevent it from falling into
the cab of the engine and then told the engineer he was
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ready for the coupling to be made. The fireman then
started down the gate as one does in descending a ladder :
that is, he had his back to the engine and engineer and his
face to the south and to the tender. His feet were on the
slats of the gate, his shovel was in his right hand and he
was holding onto the top slat with his left. He had gotten
his feet about two steps down the ladder and was leaning
over the top thereof with his stomach and face to the
coal (in order to get under the projecting roof of the
cab) when the engine moving south in the direction he
was facing, reached and made impact with the train.
Plaintiff's evidence was that the coupling was
harder than any he had ever seen. The violence of the
blow broke the hold of his left hand and precipitated him
to the floor of the cab, causing the injuries complained
of. It was urged by defendant that plaintiff's contributory negligence caused his fall. The Court rej·ected
that contention and held as a matter of law that there
was no contributory negligence involved in the case. The
Court said, p. 773 :
"What has been said has some application
also to the objection made to plaintiff's instruction on the measure of damages because it fails
to tell the jury of the effect of contributory negligence in diminishing the damages recoverable under the federal act. In addition to the failure of
the pleadings to present an issue of contributory
negligence and the obvious disclaimer of any claim
of that kind in the case, it may be observed that
we are unable to see wherein the element of contributory negligence is presented either by pleadings or by the evidence. Plaintiff was upon the
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coal at the top of the tender where he was required to be, and his affirmative answer to the
engineer that he was ready was not a consent
that the engineer should recklessly strike the cars
in making the coupling. If he had remained upon
his unsteady footing upon the coal until the engine violently struck the cars, he would have been
in equal or greater danger of being thrown down
from that position. His start down the ladder
was in the direct line of his duties, and was necessary in order to regain his place in the engine.
And when he started down he could not foresee
that the coupling would be a violent one. Even
if the start was rapid, he had a right to suppose
that the engineer would observe care before the
engine reached the coupling point. The evidence
is that it was the unusual violence of the coupling
that broke his hold and caused him to fall, and
there is none whatever that an ordinary coupling
would have broken his hold, or did cause him to
fall. Hence we see no necessity for going into the
question whether a plaintiff is required to instruct upon the effect, of contributory negligence
in a suit under the federal act, even though no
defense of that kind is pleaded or raised by defendant. It is urged that the federal act changes
the substantive law in regard to contributory negligence, and makes it a matter of diminution of
damages rather than a partial defense, and, since
matters in diminution of damages need not be
specially pleaded, the plaintiff should have covered the effect of contributory negligence in his
instruction on the measure of damages regardless
of defendant's failure to plead it. But assuming,
without deciding, that this is true, nevertheless
it should have no application where neither the
pleading nor the evidence discloses contributory
negligence, and the case is tried on the theory
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that there is none, and with the express disclaiiner by the defendant of any claim that there
is any such negligence. Thornt~on ,on Federal Employers' Liahility and Safety Aprplialnce Acts (2d
Ed.) Sec. 9-!, says:
'· 'This federal statute has not changed the
rule with reference to the presentation of contributory negligence as a defense, except it is now
only a partial defense. In the federal courts the
burden of presenting contributory negligence of
the plaintiff as a defense has always been upon
the defendant, and this burden still continues in
a suit brought under this statute.'
''The author then goes on to state that, when
the plaintiff has shown facts from which the jury
can estimate his damages, if the defendant desires to reduce them by showing plaintiff's contributory negligence, he has the burden of doing
so, and that, even if the rule of the state be that
the plaintiff must show himself free of fault,
still such rule is changed by the federal act, and
does not apply in a suit thereunder. In the present case the state rule and the federal rule are
the same.
"Roberts on Injuries to Intersbate Errtjpiloyees, Sec. 119, says whether contributory negligence must be pleaded, in order to be available to
the defendant, depends upon the law of the state
where the action is pending, though he also raises
the question now urged by defendant herein. But,
as we have said, owing to the absence of contributory negligence, either as a matter of law or as
a matter of fact for the jury, in the pleadings,
evidence, and theory upon which tlw case was
tried, we see no reason for determining in this
case the interesting question defendant now raises
for the first time herein.''
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Goodman v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 289 Ill. App.
320, 7 N. E. (2d) 393. This action was brought under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act by plaintiff as
Administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband on
account of his death. It appeared that decedent was in
the employment of the defendant as a freight engineer.
He was killed in a collision of his freight train with a
coal train which was being moved from a side track onto
the main line on which the freight train was travelling.
The negligence alleged on the part of the defendant was
in operating the freight train from the side track onto
the main line without ascertaining whether or not the
main line was clear.
It appeared from the undisputed evidence in the
case that orders had been given decedent telling him
that the track ahead was clear all the way through to a
designated point and that he had a right of way. Defendant contended, however, that decedent was guilty of
contributory negligence in violating a rule requiring an
extra train to move within yard limits prepared to stop
unless the main track was seen or known to be clear.
The jury assessed damages in the amount of $30,000.00 and in response to a special interrogatory decided that decedent's contributory negligence contributed to the accident in the amount of $20,000.00. The
trial court in effect held that as a matter of law decedent's orders that the track ahead was clear to a designated point, took precedence over the rule heretofore
mentioned, and that decedent was not guilty of contributory negligence. The trial court disregarded the anSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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swer to the interrogatory and entered judgment upon the
verdict against the defendant for $30,000.00 The Supreme Court supported the trial court's ruling.
From the opinion we quote, page 400 :
"Plaintiff objected to the giving of the above
interrogatory to the jury on behalf of defendant,
and we think rightfully so. The purpose of giving a special interrogatory is to ask the jury to
decide some controlling question in the case which,
if returned in the affirmative, would control the
general verdict. In Chicago & A. R. R. Co. v. Harrington, 192 III. 9, at page 32, 61 N. E. 622, 630,
the court said: 'This interrogatory was properly
refused, because an affirmative answer to it could
not have controlled a general verdict had it been
in favor of appellee.'
"In addition to that the interrogatory asked
the jury to state the amount they 'deduct' by way
of damages. As the Supreme Court of the United
States said in the case of Seaboard Air Line Ry.
v. Tilghman, 237 U. S. 499, at page 501, 35 S.
Ct. 653, 654, 59 L. Ed. 1069 : ' * * * where the
causal negligence is attributable partly to the carrier and partly to the injured employee, he shall
not recover full damages, but only a diminished
sum bearing the same relation to the full damages that the negligence attributable to the carrier bears to the negligence attributable to both;
the purpose being to exclude from the recover"J a
proportional part of the damages corresponding
to the employee's contribution to the total negligence.'
"When the interrogatory asked the jury 'how
much they deduct' it was confusing and mislead-
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ing and should not have been given. In addition
to that, if the jury had intended to find that plaintiff's intestate was guilty of contributory negligence to the extent of $20,000, such finding would
have been against the manifest weight .of the
evidence.
''As was said in the case of Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Earnest, 229 U. S. 114, at page
120, 33 S. Ct. 654, 656, 57 L. Ed. 1096, Ann. Cas.
1914C, 172: 'If the defendant relies upon the
defense of contribulory negligence, the bu.rden is
upon it to establish that defense by a preponderance of the evid.ence.'
''In this case defendant failed to prove contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff's
intestate ·and any such finding, if 'it had been made
by the ju.r'Y, shotuld have been set aside by the
trial court .as being ag.ainst the Jnanifest: weight
of the evidence."
Davis' Adm'r et al v. Cincinrnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry.
Co., 188 S. W. 1061. Plaintiff brought action as Administrator on behalf of the widow and minor child of decedent for his wrongfull death under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The petition prayed for judgment of $30,000.00, but 'upon the trial the jury returned
a verdict against the defendant for $2,000.00. The plaintiff appealed, citing as error the submission to the jury
of the question of decedent's contributory negligence.
The facts are briefly as follows: Decedent, a young man
21 years of age, was killed by the wrecking of a passenger train causing the engine to overturn and fall on
him. It appeared that the engine was being driven at
an excessive rate of speed around a curve where the
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ties were old and decayed and the spikes were loose causing an excessive amount of sway on the part of the engine as it proceeded around the curve. There was no affirmative evidence indicating that decedent had any
duty "i th respect to the speed at which the engine was
being driven at the time and place of the accident.
The appellate court reversed and granted plaintiff
a new trial, among other things, for the reason that the
trial court had committed prejudicial error in submitting the question of contributory negligence to the jury.
The court stated, page 1064:
"There is absolutely no proof of any fact or
circumstance looking to the establishment of any
negligence on behalf of the deceased. If the train
was running at an excessive and reckless rate of
speed the jury might have erroneously concluded
that, inasmuch as the deceased was working with
the engineer, and in a way assisting to propel the
train, he may have been' somewhat to blame for
this rate of speed. Such a conclusion would have
been entirely unjustifiable from any fact proven
by the testimony; but, having had their attention called by the court to the contributory negligence of the deceased, the jury may have concluded that the court saw something in the evidence justifying the instruction, and, inasmuch as
it allowed a diminishing of the dmnages, such effect may have been given to it. We are the more
impressed with this possible consequence of the
error in giving the instruction when we consider
the size of the verdict returned. But, as. there is
to be another trial we will not further comment
upon this point, except to say that, under the circumstances,
we think it was prejudicial error to
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have given any instruction on the question of
contributory negligence, or to have allowed the
jury the right to diminish the damages by reason
thereof.''
In Norton v. Maine Central Ry. Co., 100 Atl. 598
(Maine, 1917), it appeared that a railroad brakeman
was knocked from his position on top of the train by
a bridge girder. The uncontroverted evidence revealed
that the brakeman had no knowledge of the bridge girder nor had he been warned of its presence by the railroad company. Defendant contended on appeal that
plaintiff was contributorily negligent and the appellate
court held as a matter of law that it was encumbent
upon the defendant to prove affirmatively his contention of contributory negligence and that having failed
to introduce any affirmative evidence revealing contributory negligence, that that issue was properly resolved
against the defendant as a matter of law.

Bruner v. McCarthy et al, 142 P. (2d) 649, 651,
105 Utah 399, (1943). The plaintiff, who was employed
as a hostler's helper on the railroad of defendants, was
injured in the course of his employment. He brought action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Trial
resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendants
appealed. One Colosimo, the hostler, and plaintiff as the
helper, were engaged in loading coal in two engines
coupled together. While plaintiff was crawling over the
drawbar between the engines to reach a ladder on the
tender, the engines were suddenly started without the
customary signal from the plaintiff, or without any
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warning, causing the injuries complained of. Error was
assigned in the refusal of the trial court to submit the
question of plaintiff's contributory negligence to the
jury. This court supported the trial court and held that
there was no contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff as a matter of law. The Court stated:
'·The defendant's claim that the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence in that of the
several ways by which he could have climbed to
the top of the tender. he chose the only dangerous one; that the "\Yay chosen was not customarily
used and was highly dangerous. Defendants also
contend that the plaintiff, who was to follow Colosimo's directions, had been ordered by Colosimo
to stay on Engine 1182; that if he had obeyed this
order he would not have been injured; and that
Colosimo had a right to assume that the plaintiff
"~ould obey this order. One difficulty with this
position is that the record does not support it.
There is no testimony tending to show that it
was more dangerous to mount the tender in the
manner chosen by the plaintiff. Defendants apparently rely on Exhibit 3, which is a picture of
these two engines coupled together. This picture
shows the draw bar and other items relating to
the hand holds, etc., on the route which the plaintiff chose. However, we cannot from this picture
conclude that the manner chosen was highly dangerous and a method not customarily used. The
evidence merely shows that there were several
ways by which the plaintiff could have gotten on
top of the tender. The manner in which he was
to get there was left to his own judgment. The
record does not show that the way he chose was
the more dangerous way. Nor does the evidence
show that Colosimo ordered the plaintiff to stay
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on Engine 1182. True, Colosimo did testify that
'I just told him to stay on 1182. That is what I
told him, just to stay on 1182, and I would take
care of the 1149.' But it is clear that what he
meant by this was merely that plaintiff should
confine his work to 1182 and Colosimo would
take care of 1149; for in response to the question:
'All you meant hy that was that you would take
care of 1149 and Bruner would take care of 1182~',
Colosimo answered: 'Yes, Sir.' This interpretation of this statement is further borne out by the
remainder of Colosimo's testimony.
"We have then this situation: These two
men, working together for the first time, were
stopping and starting the train according to signals given by the plaintiff. The engines were stopped; Colosimo was putting coal in Engine 1149.
It was the plaintiff's duty to get on top of the
tender on Engine 1182. He chose a manner of
getting there which is not shown by the evidence
to be either unusual or dangerous. In fact the
only evidence is that which he gave that he had
often used this route and that it was a common
practice among yardmen to do so. Colosimo, without giving a signal or without knowing where the
plaintiff was, started the engines and threw the
plaintiff to the tracks and under the wheels of
one engine. The plaintiff was doing exactly what
he was requi.red to do in the performance of his
duties, towit, getting on top of the tender. While
it may be, a.s defendants argue in their brief,
that the manner chosen was highly dall1Jgerous,
there is no evidence bo show this. We must conclude that the record does not show contributory
negligence.
''Even if there were several means of reaching a point where plaintiff was required to be
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and one was more safe than the others but all
were reasonably safe without movement of the
engine and the plaintiff had a right to rely on the
engineer and asstune that he would not start the
engine until he received a signal, we do not think
the choice of the less safe .,.,oute oould. be considered as haring contributed to the accident when
it zcas apparent that the unexpected jar carused
by the engine's nwvement dislodged the pZairt.tiff. Et:en had the latter chosen the safest route,
a jar wmich he had a right not to expect, and in
regard to such noHexpectation it could be presumed he tcmt-ld have regulated his holds .and care
of traversal, the dislodgment might have happened. This is a case where the parties were
members of a \Yorking crew working on signals
designed for the very safety of that work. Where
the accident has been caused by the failure to
give such signal the party working in a crew
responsible for such omission will not be heard
to say that the injury suffered could have been
avoided had the injured party conducted himself
on the assumption that the signal would not be
given; that the consequences of the delict could
have been avoided had the injured party, as appears from hindsight, so conducted or positioned
himself as to make the delict inconsequential.
There are perhaps few instances of accidents in
industry where one party injured by the negligence of another might not, had he been warned
of the negligence, have placed himself in more advantageous position to avoid its consequences.
One of the criteria in determining the standard
of care required in industry to fend off a defense
of contributory negligence is not one fashioned
by the imagination of judges sitting in their chambers but one measured by the conduct and practices of the average experienced workman en-
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gaged in that industry in relation to others working with him in their immediate joint enterprise
under the system of signals designed for the
safety of such parties engaged in the enterprise.
The care which a prudent person will exercise not
to injure others and that which he will exercise
in order to protect himself from the uncontemplated action of others are not necessarily
governed by the same circumstances. One for
whose benefit such signal is to be given may,
while in the conduct of the enterprise, rely on
the other to give it; and the latter may not, where
the other has acted according to the standard set
by the accustomed behavior under such mutual
undertakings, urge that greater care would have
avoided the consequences of his omission to give
the signal.''
In the case at bar plaintiff was doing exactly what
he was required to do in the performance of his duties,
to wit: moving along the top of the car preparing to
dismount. He was in a position where he was required to
be, to wit: a position where he could maintain visual
communication with the engineer. It is apparent that
the unexpected jar caused by the engine's movement
dislodged the plaintiff. This case is undistinguishable
on any principle of law from the. decision in the B~er
case. If defendant contends that plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence it is encumbent upon it to introduce affirmative proof to that effect. No such proof
exists in the record of this case.
The only evidence, if it may be so designated, of
plaintiff's contributory negligence was the fact of his
injury and we, of course, are well aware that a holding
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

113
by this Court that the mere fact of injury is itself evidence of neglect would do Yiolence to the contentions of
law as vigorously made by railroad counsel from time
immemorial. The Supreme Court of the United States
has declared against any such proposition in unmistakable language in all of its recent decisions. See Wilkerson
r. JlcCarthy, (Utah), 187 P. 2d 188, 69 S. Ct. 29, recently
decided in that court. The defendant's conception of
the law in that regard is shown by its Request No. 5
(R. 43):
''You are instructed that negligence in the
operation of the train on which the plaintiff was
riding cannot be inferred or presumed from the
fact that plaintiff fell from the car and was injured. X egligence in the operation of the train as
claimed by the plaintiff must be proved by him
by a preponderance of the evidence and if he fails
to sustain that burden, he cannot recover damages
for the injuries sustained by him.''
The Court in Instruction No. 5 stated this principle as follows (R. 57) :
"Neither negligence nor contributory negligence is to be inferred from the mere fact that
an injury occurred but must be found if at all
from a preponderance of the evidence.''
Of course, the defendant took no exception to this charge.
Plaintiff excepted to it on the ground and for the reason that he had pled a cause of action under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur which appears from his complaint, sub-paragraph (d), paragraph V1II (R. 5). Cer-
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tainly it could not be argued here that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur applied to the plaintiff. He never at
any time had any control whatsoever over the instrumentality which caused his injuries, that control being
at all times admittedly in the hands of the defendant.
The question presented is whether the mere· fact
of plaintiff's injury is proof sufficient to support the
submission and finding of contributory negligence.
In the case of Christensen v. Oregon Short LineR.
Co., 35 Utah 137, 99 P. 676, this Court declared that the
happening of an accident causing injury is no proof of
negligence unless the action is one where the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur controls.
As pointed out in the opinion 1n that case, it is
not the mere happening of an accident that is evidence
of negligence, but it is proof of the circumstances surrounding the happening of the accident which constitutes
proof or evidence of negligence. In this case the only
circumstances surrounding the happening of the accident which constitutes proof or evidence of negligence
is the proof which convinced the jury that plaintiff was
injured because of the sudden, unexpected and unwarranted jerk of the train which dislodged him from a
position of safety and threw him to the roadbed where
his right arm was mangled and destroyed. There are
simply no circumstances which indicate or prove that
plaintiff was himself negligent in any way or manner,
or at all.
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'ye respectfully

subn1it to this Court that if the only
proof of negligence on the part of the defendant was
proof of the mere happening of the accident no verdict
for plaintiff would be allowed to stand. We likewise submit that inasmuch as the only proof of plaintiff's negligence was the mere happening of the accident, this crossappeal must prevail.
CONCLUSION
With reference to defendant's appeal plaintiff respectfully submits that defendant received a fair and impartial trial before a regularly impaneled and competent jury; that the verdict as to both liability and damages was supported and sustained by adequate evidence ;
that no prejudicial error resulted from any of the instructions or rulings of the trial court, and that the damages awarded were clearly within the scope of the evidence; that no error was committed in the denial of
defendant's motion for new trial, and that defendant's
appeal has failed to disclose any error or defects in the
pleadings or procedure which adversely affected the
substantial rights of defendant and that the judgment
of the trial court should therefore be affirmed, except as
questioned by plaintiff's cross-appeal.
As to plaintiff's cross-appeal, plaintiff respectfully
submits that the court erroneously submitted the issue
of plaintiff's contributory negligence to the jury; that
the jury erroneously diminished plaintiff's judgment
on the ground of contributory negligence, and that as
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matter of law and fact there was not a single scintilla of
evidence in the record of plaintiff's contributory negligence and that the error so committed adversely affected
the substantial rights of plaintiff and therefore the error
should now be corrected and the diminution of damages
made by the jury disallowed and the judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $70,000.00 restored.
Respectfully submitted,

RAWLINGS, WALLACE & BLACK
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS
WAYNE L. BLACK
Atto.rneys for Respondent arnd
Cross-App,ellant.
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